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PREFACE
 
This report, the first in 
a series of case studies constituting one
 
phase of the International Housing Productivity Study, describes the social
 
and 	economic benefits of rehousing mine workers in Hambeek, Korea. 
The
 
study seeks to articulate an economic framework for analyzing the position
 
of housing in development programs,
 
The Hambaek site was Identified with the assistance of Agency for
 
International Development personnel in Korea. 
Mr. 	Frank M, Lenders and Mr,
 
Pi 
 Kyoon Kim of the USAID Mission in Korea were particularly helpful in this
 
respect and assisted the author materially during his visit to Seoul and
 
Hambeek during June 1965, 
Others in Korea who supplied valuable information
 
for 	the study were Mr. Sang Yong Ha, Governor of the Dee Han Coal Corporation,
 
Mr. 	Hyun K. Kim and Mr. Joo H. Kim and Mr. Seung M. Yang and other staff
 
members of the Corporation, and Mr. Sang Ho Lee, manager of the Research
 
Department, Bank of Korea. 
The data were processed by the Western Data
 
Processing Center, UCLA. 
Drafts of the report were reviewed by Leland S. Burns,
 
Marvin Hoffenberg, Frank G, Mittelbach, and E. H. Mulder. 
Roberta Campbell,
 
Joyce Chamberlain and Ronald McDaniel provided valuable research assistance,
 
Miss Jill Nichols typed the final report, The author is grateful to these
 
persons and 
institutions, but naturally accepts responsibility for the accuracy
 
of the analysis and results.
 
-B. 	Khinq Tjioe
 
July 1966
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1. RESUME
 
This report consists of estimates and an analysis of
 
the benefits of qualitatively superior housing and community
 
facilities based on experiences covering a recent three-year
 
period in Hambaek, Korea. Benefits, measured in monetary units,
 
are allocated among the "community-:t-large," the sponsor­
employer, and the rehoused employees.
 
Two major questions are addressed. First, does housing
 
favorably affect the labor productivity and health of persons
 
rehoused? Second, if so, how large are the effects?
 
Evidence supporting a positive answer to the first 
question is abundant and clear, Health and labor productivity 
improve with improved housing -- and the conclusion is statis­
tically significant at a high level of confidence. The follow­
ing 	results emerge:
 
1. After an initial adjustment period of roughly one
 
year's duration, output per rehoused worker increased
 
to a new level 31 percent higher than prior to re­
housing.
 
2. Because occupancy priorities were based on producti­
vity, the productivity of persons not rehoused also
 
increased. This has been termed the "demonstration
 
effect" and accounted for an average productivity
 
increase of about 27 percent per worker.
 
3. 	Savings in medical costs for the rehoused were sub­
stantial with expenditures for this purpose declining

an effective 67 percent per capita after relocation
 
in the housing project.
 
4. These, plus other benefits to the corporation and
 
community-at-large, totaled to an impressive sum.
 
The investor netted a return of approximately
 
16 percent on total capital invested in the housing
 
project and the returns to the community-at-large
 
were slightly higher. The rate of return compared
 
Sfavorably with that of alternative investments In
 
Korea.
 
Based on this tentative evidence, the investment in Im­
proved housing was favorable indeed. The returns promoted econo­
mic growth of this developing region, improved the profit position
 
of the sponsor-employer, and raised the living standards of the
 
rehoused workers.
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2. INTRODUCTION
 
This report consists of estimates and an analysis of the benefits which
 
may be ascribed to improved housing in a developing area of Southeast Asia,
 
It represents one of the first attempts at such estimation and, to the best of
 
our knowledge, the only effort undertaken in a less developed country. 1
 
One approaches such research somewhat patronizingly, it has been stated,2
 
because the favorable effects of better housing are intuitively apparent. Yet,
 
the task of isolating the effects of housing, as separate from other changes
 
in the home or work environment, is challenging and full of booby-traps, In
 
a concrete, real-life situation such as 
the one we have chosen where estimates
 
are based on historical evidence and on circumstances which are substantially
 
less favorable than laboratory conditions, we are faced with the formidable
 
chore of proving that the benefits spring from housing, and housinq alone,
 
The task takes on added importance when the results seem unduly favorable.
 
Our estimates of benefits tally to an impressive figure which, when related
 
to costs, show that housing investment is highly productive, even in comparison
 
with the "gilt-edged" projects customarily heading the priority lists of
 
development programs.
 
1 For studies dealing with the economic benefits of housing for displaced
 
slum dwellers in the U.S., see David A, Page, "Urban Renewal," a paper,pre­
sented to the Bureau of the Budget, August 10, 1965, processed; and Jerome
 
Rothenberg, "Urban Renewal Programs", in Robert Dorfman (ed.), Measuring Benefits 
of Government Investments (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965);
plus the work on which this report builds, Leland S. Burns and others, Report 
on a Pilot Study of Worker Productivity in Relation to Housing Conditions
 
(Los Angeles: International Housing Productivity Study, University of Cali­
fornia, 1965), processed,
 
2 Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity t Research Report No. 1,

Division of Research and Statistics, Social Security Administration, U. S.
 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Washington, D. C.: U. So
 
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 7.
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These startling results double our anxiety when contrasted with other
 
estimates which, 3
as we have pointed out elsewhere, show that the traditional
 
measures, based on a narrow definition of output, place housing at or near the
 
bottom of any list of investment projects. The estimates developed here, if
 
reliable, advance housing many rungs up the priority ladder.
 
2.1. Some Caveats
 
Our results would offer substantial comfort for those dedicated to the
 
cause of improved housing if the conditions of ceteris paribus were satisfied
 
with certitude rather than simply assumed. 
Ile too would be more assured if we
 
were fully convinced by the Information obtained that housing was solely respon­
sible for the substantial benefits we have traced in economic efficiency (or,
 
less technically, in national income).
 
In order to test the ceteris paribus assumption, we shall first track
 
down each conceivable influence on productivity other than housing and sep­
arately assessing its importance, As examples: Was it the reduction in 
over­
time work rather than qualitative improvement in housing which accounted for
 
increases in output? Did other investments, concurrently placed, increase
 
labor's efficiency? 
Have changes in wage policy influenced production? Tplse
 
questions are addressed in Section 
2o Our second test, to find statistical
 
evidence that the ceteris Daribus assumption is valid, is reported in Section 4.
 
As a corollary, a caveat on the quality and availability of data is
 
also in order. Seldom, if ever, does the supply of data meet the demands of
 
SLetlo. Klaassen and Leland S. Burns, "The Position of Housing in National
 
Economic and Social Policy," in James Gillies and Walter Harris (eds.), Capital

Formation for Housing in Latin America (Washington, D,. C.: Pan American Union,
 
1963); and Leo Grebler, "Housing and Community Facilities as Factors in Human

Development," in "Social Problems of Development and Urbanization," Volume VII
 
of Science, Technology, and Development, United States Papers Prepared for the
 
United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the
 
Benefit of the Less Developed Areas (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
 
Printing Office, 1962),
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empirical research; the Hambaek case was no exception. Little hard information
 
was available on the quality or type of investment in the coal mine, for
 
example. While we have data on 
the division of Investment between plant and
 
equipment for a few years, we know pitifully little more about the nature of this
 
investment. .
Was capital invested n equipment only for replacement of de­
preciated assets? If so, were 
the replacements technologically advanced? If
 
not, did new capital displace labor?
 
At this juncture in our research, answers often must be based on
 
reasonable assumptions. More positive statistical evidence would do much
 
to resolve our present uncertainty. Hopefully, many of the facilitating
 
assumptions in the beginning of the report could then be relaxed.
 
Secondly, the data supplied were not always in the form most amenable
 
to our purposes. For example, the ideal measure of productivity would be stated
 
in units of output per man. Because the miners performed a series of tasks
 
related to digging and mined under diverse conditions, a standard unit of physi­
cal output was not available. The only common denominator homogenizing the
 
various operations and outputs was wages* Consequently, earnings in constant
 
won had to serve as a proxy for productivity. Moreover, because miners
 
worked In teems, the ave:ne 1fn 
 the team, rather than fIr the individual, Is
 
the measure of productivity.
 
These difficulties 
-- and the unpleasant necessity for caveats 
-- will be­
come more apparent as we describe the Hambaek Housing Project and mine, wnd
 
proceed in subsequent sections to develop estimates of the benefits afforded
 
by the project to relocated miners, Throughout this analysis, the generic term
 
"productivity" will embrace all types of relevant outputs 
-- labor productivity, 
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rents, 	budget savings in medical and health expenditures, or other real income
 
increases -- traceable to a given investment, The adjective "relevant" will
 
identify any effect identified exclusively with the housing project under con­
sideration, "Relevant output," "relevant returns", "relevant earnings", or "rele­
vant benefits," each refer to the net values of output, returns, earnings, or benefits
 
attributable to the Investment in qualitatively improved housing and community facilities.
 
Section 4 consists of a description of the process of estimating the Impact
 
of improved housing and community facilities on productivity for the short run and
 
over the longer run. The relation between housing and he.alth condtonsisaddressed In
 
Section 5, In Section 6, the benefits in terms of productivity and health are
 
recalculated in money terms and compared with other investmenrt opportunities
 
in Korea.
 
2.2. 	The Hambaek Coal Mine
 
The Hambaek Coal Mine, situated in the Taebek mountains of South Korea,
 
is one of several mines owned by the South Korean Government and administered
 
by the 	Doe Han Coal Corporation. The Corporation was established November 1,
 
1950, in accordance with the D. H. C. C. Organization Law wnich took over former
 
Japanese coal interests in order to merge all coal industry development programs.
 
The Hambaek Mine was opened prior to the Korean War, closed during the War, and
 
reopened in July 1955 by the Dee Han Corporation,
 
Except for a negligible amount of employment In other industries, the
 
mine constitutes the economic base of the rural village of Hambaek and, as such,
 
is vital to the economic and social welfare of the region. Over 90 percent of
 
the 1,400 employees at the mine are production workers. With an average family
 
size of six persons, it is apparent that Hemboek's population of roughly 8,500
 
is primarily dependent for its livelihood on the mining operation (Table 1),
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Without the mine, it is likely that there would be heavy migration to urban areas
 
or substantial disguised unemployment in agriculture.4
 
TABLE 1. EMPLOYMENT, HAMBAEK MINE, 1963 AND 1964a
 
Production Workers Administrative Grand
 
Year Miners Others Total Personnel Total
 
1963 1,151 148 11299 125 1,424
 
1964 1,119 170 1,289 137 1,426
 
Source: Dee Han Coal Corporation
 
aAnnual figures derived from monthly averages.
 
Anthracite reserves of the mine are currently estimated at about 30
 
million tons. Annual production of the past decade has averaged about 225,000
 
tons; however, current production is running at roughly 400,000 tons per annum
 
(Table 2). 
 At this level, existing reserves will last for approximately 75
 
years.
 
Increasing output and unit prices are responsible for the growth in the
 
value of coal production over the past decade, The sharp increase In production
 
during 1963 and 1964, compared to earlier years, is due mainly to overtime work
 
necessitated by increased demand for coal. With a decline in demand during
 
1965, both the volume of production and the total number of hours worked de­
creased,
 
The pattern of net investment is less regular with fluctuations which
 
fail to relate in any systematic fashion with changes In production. In constant
 
4
yong Sam Cho, Disguised Unemployment in Underdeveloped Areas (Berkeley
 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), with special reference
 
to the chapter, "South Korean Agriculture",
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TABLE 2, ANNUAL PRODUCTION, HAMBAEK MINE, 1955-1965 
Year Production Value of Production Average
 
(in tons) (in 1,000 won) Price per Ton
 
(in won) 
1955a 33,978 17,329 510
 
1957 67,866 52,935 780
 
1958 75,307 58,739 780
 
1959 180,707 140,951 780
 
1960 155,611 121,376 780
 
1961 220,905 201,301 900
 
1962 279,463 276,701 985
 
1963 424,026 428,266 11010
 
1964 436,362 474,652 I,087
 
1965b 372,268 503,679 1,353
 
Source: 	 Doe Han Coal Corporation
 
BAdjusted to annual figures from 18 month data.
 
bAdjusted to annual figures from data for first nine months.
 
TABLE 3, ANNUAL NET INVESTMENT, HAMBAEK MINE, 1955-1965 
(in thousands of won)
 
Year Plant Equipment Total 
" (current) (current) (current) (constant)
 
1955b nao n.a. 39,123 86,266 
1957 n.a, n.a. 50,568 68,621 
1958 n.a. na. 39,019 54,236 
1959 n.a. n.a. 85,665 107,253 
1960 n.a. n.a. 38,217 43,529 
1961 n.a. n.a, 67,884 74,537 
1962 n.a. n.a. 83,036 90,675 
1963 n.a. n.a. 99,830c 99,838 
1964 27,053 37,039 64,092 51,145 
19 65d 26,671 28,793 41,597 n.a. 
Source: 	 Current data from Dae Han Coal Corporation; deflater from
 
The Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review, November 1962,
 
p. 39, and April 1965, p. 39.
 
aCurrent 	data deflated by index of wholesale prices for machinery
 
(1963 = 100).
bAdjusted to annual figures from 18 month data.
 
cExcludes investment in housing project of 108,2 million won,
 
dAdjusted to annual figures from data for first nine months.
 
money units based on 1963 prices, annual investment over the past decade
 
averaged 75 million won and ranged between 107 million in 1959 to 44 million
 
In 1964 (Table 3).
 
2.3, The Hambaek Housing Project
 
At the initiative of the United States Operation Mission 
to Korea (USOM),
 
the planning and development of the Hambaek Housing Project was carried out by
 
the Ministry of Construction and the Technical Staff of the Housing and lome
 
Development Fund of the Korean Reconstruction Bank, in collaboration with USOM.
 
The U. S. contribution consisted of technical assistance plus a counterpart
 
loan to the Dae Han Coal Corporation, the owner-sponsor. The loan was repayable
 
by the Corporation over a maximum period of ten years at four percent per annum
 
of the unpaid balance. The project was completed and occupied September 23, 1963,
 
16 months after the start of site preparation and construction. The financing
 
and costs of the project, totaling 108.2 million won ($832,300)5 , were dis­
tributed as in Table 4. Figure I shows examples of typical new and old units
 
and locates the project on the flambaek map.
 
TABLE 4, SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS OF FUNDS, IAMBAEK HOUSING PROJECT
 
(in thousands of won)
 
Sources Applications 
U. S. contribution 52,200 (48.2%) Materials 61,104 (56.5%) 
Project sponsor 
Labor 
Land and land 
24,893 (23.0%) 
(Dae lHan Coal 
Corporation) 56,000 (51.8%) 
development 
Other 
17,440 
4,763 
(16,1%) 
(4.4%) 
Total 108,200 (100.0%) Total 108,200 (100.0%) 
Source: Agency for International Development, "Airgram A-530," October 1, 1963.
 
5The official exchange rate in 1963 was 130 won = $).00; it is currently

270 won = $1.00. Because it takes no account of purchasing power differentials,
 
the won dollar comparisons should be regarded as oly the crudest equivalents.
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The project consisted of 500 housing units distributed by size and cost
 
as in Table 5. The three large units were built for top management at the cost
 
of the Corporation, In addition to housing for the miners, the project included
 
a public bathhouse, kindergarten with recreation facilities for children, a
 
barber shop and beauty parlor, and a grain distribution center. These facilities
 
are located about one mile from the existing project and are used almost ex­
clusively by the rehoused families. 
TABLE 5 DISTRIBUTION OF NEW HOUSING UNITS BY SIZE AND COST, HA6BAEK HOUSING PROJMf 
-Number of Area per Cost per Cost per 
Housing Units Housing Unit Unit Area Housing Unit 
"InSqure In Per Pyung Per 5q. Ft. 
Feet Pyung8 (in won) (in dollars) in von in dollars 
410 324 9 14,500 $3.10 130,500 $1,004
 
34 540 15 15,200 $3,25 228,000 $1,754
 
17 720 20 15,600 $3.33 312,000 $2,400
 
36b 396 11 19,900 $4.25 218,900 $1,684
 
2c 
 900 25 neam n.a° na. n.a.
 
1e 1,080 30 neao n.a, n,a# na,
 
500
 
Source: Agency for International Development, "Airgram A-530", October 1, 1963.
 
aOne pyAng equals 35.6 square feet.
 
bApartment dwelling.
 
CUnits for executive personnel; detailed cost information not available.
 
The weighted average area (exclusive of the three homes for executives)
 
was ten pyung or 356 square feet per unit and the weighted average cost was
 
149,781 won or $1,152 at the then prevailing exchange rate of 130 won per U. S.
 
dollar, Land accounted for 9.736 won ($75) per unit or 6,5 percent of this
 
amount. It should be noted, however, that most of the units were constructed
 
at a cost of approximately $1,000 including land.
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The scheme for allocating the new dwellings among the mine workers gave
 
preference to those employees (1) who worked in the tunnel, (2) with seniority,
 
and (3) with higher productivities. No rent was charged for the houses but a
 
nominal charge was levied for maintenance and electricity,
 
Workers living in the old houses not owned by the Corporation received
 
rent compensation of 300 won per month, 
Because the market rent for comparable
 
houses outside the Project was at least 500 won, monthly rent for the houses in
 
the project can be conservatively estimated at the same amount.
 
The 500 houses in the demonstration project are for superior in quality
 
to the existing stock of dwellings, particularly with respect to protection
 
from the elements and the availability of utilities and sanitary facilities.
 
The new houses are better insulated than the old and are equipped with chimneys.
 
The lack of chimneys in most of the old structures meant that in order to
 
generate sufficient heat, smoke from the cooking and heating fire was necessarily
 
confined within the structure.
 
In contrast to the new dwelling units, most of the old had neither
 
running water nor electricity, 
The best old houses had only running water and
 
exterior sanitary facilities which served a block of houses. 
Traditionally,
 
the river has supplied the residents of lHambaek with water for washing and
 
toilet purposes, 6
 
Occupancy density and intensity were also lower in the new units
 
(Table 6). 
 Density, a measure of space consumption, is calculated as the
 
floor area per person. 
For the average new unit, the amount of habitable
 
space per resident was double that of the old. 
The average densities in both
 
the new and the old units, 143 and 61 square feet per person respectively,
 
6 For comparative national data, see Appendix IV.
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were within the bounds of 35 to 80 square feet established by the United Nations
 
as space standards for "desirable type shelter accommodations."7
 
TABLE 6. OCCUPANCY INTENSITY AND DENSITY, HAMBAEK AND KOREA
 
I Area Per Person 
Families Persons Per Room In Pyung In Sq. Ft
 
Hambaek families rehouseda 
 2.5 4.0 142.6
 
Hambaek families not rehouseda 
 4.6 1.7 61.2
 
South Korea families (19 60 )b 
 2.5 0.6 21.4
 
aBesides both Hambaek groups there is 
a third group living in old company
 
houses at an occupancy intensity of 3.5 persons per room; 
these families are
 
bexcluded from our analysis.

Estimates from 1960 Census data on 
the total number of rooms in Korean houses
 
and total Korean population, See Appendix IV.
 
The second measure, occupancy intensity, is an indicator of relative
 
privacy calculated as the number of persons per room. Standards set by the
 
American Public Health Association recommend that the ratio not exceed one person
 
per room in minimal housing. Neither the new nor the old units approximated
 
this standard; however, the new dwellings, with a ratio of 2.5 persons per room,
 
more closely approached the desirable standard for privacy than the old units
 
with 4.6 persons per room.
 
The standards for minimum or desirable levels of shelter are relative,
 
depending for instance on whether the units are built in rural 
or urban areas,
 
on the size and age composition of families, on costs, on climate, and on a
 
7 United Nations, Goals and Standards for Housingand Environmental Develop­
ment (Geneva: 
United Nations, January 15, 1964), p. 12. In contrast, standards
 
set by the American Public Health Association some years ago are 400 square feet
 
for one person, 750 for two, 
1,000 for three, and so on. American Public Health
 
Association, Planning the Home for Occupancy, Public Administration Service,

Chicago, Illinois, 1950 and American Public Health Association, Committee on
 
the Hygiene of Housing, Basic Principles of Healthful Housing, New York, Second
 
Edition (1939).
 
host of other factors. The most relevant considerations for purposes of
 
productivity measurement are the quality changes as reflected by differences
 
between new and old.
 
While the new dwellings in the Hambaek project would be substandard
 
by the norms set for developed countries, the differences with the former
 
accommodations of the rehoused families are considerable. 
In sum, the new
 
project satisfied the criterion of a sudden and substantial improvement in the
 
quality of housing and community facilities. In the next section, we analyze
 
the benefits of the investment in this improvement.
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3. SITE SELECTION AND SAMPLE DESIGN
 
3. 	1. Site Selection Criteria
 
The conduct of meaningful research into questions dealing with the pro­
ductivity of investment requires conditions approaching those of a laboratory.
 
This is particularly true for regions in the throes of early growth where,
 
in the interests of balanced development, investment is spread concurrently
 
among a number of sectors rather than concentrated in only one or a very few,
 
The Hambaek project approached the ideal in certain important respects., The
 
suitability of this site for our purposes was assessed against the following
 
criteria:
 
a. 	The production process must be in operation before, during, and
 
after a sudden qualitative improvement in housingo
 
The Hambaek mine has been in continuous operation since mid-1955 The
 
housing project was occupied eight years later, The time period covered in
 
our analysis extends from September 1962, one year before rehousing, to two
 
years after. As noted in the previous section, the new units in the housing
 
project are qualitatively superior by a broad margin over the former accommo­
dations of rehoused workers,
 
b. The "income effect" must be absent or amenable to control0
 
A simple, positive association between housing conditions and productivity
 
reveals little about the direction of causation. Increased labor productivity
 
or efficiency implies higher income and, in turn, Increased ability to pay for
 
more expensive, better quality dwellings, If cause is primarily in this
 
direction, then productivity is the determinant of housing quality rather than
 
the effect, In the opposite case with better housing as the nexus, improved
 
living accommodations would generate hiqher incomes via Increased labor
 
ld
 
The "income effect" thus connotes the ability to pay for better
 productivity. 

quality housing through effective demand. To isolate the effects 
of housing
 
transmitted through quality, the income effect must be eliminated 
if indeed
 
it exists. The postulated sequence of events thus runs from a change 
in housing
 
The sequence is traced by comparing labor pro­quality to a change in income. 

ductivity of rehoused workers before and after their relocation, 
As subsequently
 
average income during the year prior to relocation re­noted (Section 4.2), 

mained constant and changed only during the year following. Hence, 
the "income
 
effect" was inoperative.
 
c. The environment external to housing must remain unchanged over 
the
 
measurement period.
 
Like the income effect, important changes in the non-housing environment
 
Because the
 
would distort any analysis of the housing-productivity relationship. 

real environment is rarely so static,however, appropriate adjustments must be
 
made for any non-housing changes bearing on productivity. The "before-and­
job training pro­
after" comparisons would be meaningless if,for example, a 

analysis, or substantial in­gram had been instituted durinq the period of our 

vestment had been made in new equipment which saved or replaced labor, 
or any
 
Consequently,

other factor significantly affecting work performance had changed. 

must be introduced into the "before­a second dimension -- "with-and-without" --

The influence of non-housing factors on performance can
 and-after" framework. 

be identified by observing the performance over a coterminous period of a
 
This exercise also
 
sample composed of workers not rehoused (a control group). 

provides the information necessary for "holding constant" the non-housing
 
Adjusting the before-after changes in performance of persons re­environment. 

same
housed (a test group) by the performance of the control group during the 

time period leaves the changes resulting from housing as a residual.
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While this simple exercise for controlling for irrelevant changes is
 
common to research methodology, its application in this case is confounded by
 
occupancy policy which based priorities on performance at work. Consequently,
 
it follows that the active bidding for a relatively short supply of new units
 
would (and did) lead to vigorous competition among non-rehoused workers seeking
 
units as they became available either through additions to stock or vacancies.
 
Under these circumstances, the improvements in productivity of the control
 
group may priperly be credited to housing and community facilities, but the
 
adjustments normally possible in the usual "with-and-without" framework are
 
inappropriate.
 
This places the researcher in the somewhat uncomfortable position of
 
defending the estimates he has imputed to housing and community facilities
 
strictly on the basis of ceteris paribus. To assume "all else equal" may be
 
convenient but meaningless in 
an instance where careful and correct estimation
 
of particular benefits is requisite. The questions that must be addressed are:
 
First, what changes in non-housing conditions may have affected productivity?
 
Second, have these conditions had sizable effects on productivity and, if so,
 
how can they be compensated? Our evidence, discussed in Section 4.4, indicates
 
that the assumed ceteris paribus is acceptable and, consequently, that observed
 
changes may safely be attributed to housing improvements.
 
Of major concern is any non-housing investment made during the period
 
under consideration which may, intentionally or not, have improved the quality
 
of labor. Such investment takes many forms ranging from education and health
 
programs for children with "pay-offs" delayed until entrance into the labor
 
force, through on-the-job-training programs which generate quick returns in
 
the form of increased efficiency at work, to technologically superior equipment
 
which increases output without increasing inputs of labor.
 
Changes of this sort frequently can be identified from the composition
 
of new investment. 
While our data reveal pitifully little about this structure,
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certain inferences, crude as they may be, can be drawn from changes in the total.
 
If, for example, the level remains relatively constant over time and the life
 
of assets is reasonably short on average, it seems likely that a substantial
 
share of new investment is for the replacement of depreciating or depreciated
 
assets. (This is not to deny, however, that replacement equipment may be
 
superior technologically to the old and improve labor's efficiencyJ) Conse­
quently, a fairly substantial share of new investment may have been allocated
 
for the replacement of existing plant and equipment with like substitutes
 
(Table 3).
 
If one can assume that new investment has maintained a reasonably standard
 
composition since 1963, then the problem nearly disappears. The data analyzed
 
later in this section indicates that labor productivity remained unchanged in
 
the year before rehousing, yet during this same year, new investment amounted
 
to nearly 99 million won, a fairly substantial increase exceeding 10 percent
 
over the previous year. In the year following rehousing, this amount decreased
 
to about 51 million won, a decline of about 49 percent over the level of the
 
previous year (Table 3). If non-housing investment had an immediate bearing
 
on productivity, one would expect the effects to become apparent during 1963
 
when, in fact, labor productivity remained stable. Hence, if the assumed con­
stant distribution of new investment is tenable, one can dismiss non-housing
 
investment from consideration as an exogenous influence of consequence.
 
The structure of investment reveals little about changes in work con­
ditions which may bear importantly on productivity. Changes In incentive systems,
 
in personnel policies, in plant lay-out, in work methods or flow, or in the
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Knowleageable
 
availability of overtime each could influence the individual level of output./
 
officials at the Jlambaek operation assured us that the general conditions
 
of work remained unchanged during the measurement period. Specifically, no changes
 
had been made In plant layout, work methods or flow, or in other management tech­
niques which might alter work efficiency. The amount of overtime work, however,
 
declined during 1965. If efficiency runs inversely with length of work day,
 
as one might suppose, it would follow that productivity would increase as over­
time decreased. Investigation indicated that overtime hours accounted for a
 
negligible share of total time on the job in 1964. 
With the lapse of overtime
 
work, the total number of hours worked by the test group declined only 1.4
 
percent and remained unchanged for the control group. In sum, changes in the work
 
environment,including the small decline in total working time, can be disregarded
 
as a factor potentially distorting our measurements of labor productivity.
 
The community facilities associated with the housing project cannot be
 
excluded from consideration however. Generally, such investment would favorably
 
affect labor productivity, but from the nature of the facilities (Section 2.3),
 
it seems unlikely that their effects would seriously bias the effects attributed
 
to housing. However, because we are unable to separate the costs of these
 
facilities and they constitute an integral part of the project, we will consider
 
ther with housing. In this sense, whatever benefits are attributed to housing
 
are technically attributed to the package, housing and community facilities,
 
d. The worker must be able to control his level and rate of production.
 
In order to estimate the effect on labor productivity of environmental
 
change, output level must be subject largely to the worker's own control. If
 
output is machine-dictated, or if the employee is hired for a certain time period
 
without regard for availability of work, then it cannot be assumed that the worker
 
controls his rate of output. Since the individual's output was not machine­
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dictated, but related to personal effort and availability for work, the Hambaek
 
mine met these requirements.
 
Related to this criterion is the requirement that workers have mastered
 
are past the initial learning stage. Productivity increases
their tasks and 

Since the most rapid increases
achieved by repetition of tasks must be excluded, 

in the earliest stages of employment, the measurement
in learning normally occur 

period should embrace the interval when the employees' productivity is nearly
 
The 	tenures of most Hambaek employees are extended and well
constant over time, 

past the initial learning stages l The constant pre-rehousing production level
 
estimated for both control and test groups (Section 4.2) further substantiates
 
this fact.
 
e. 	Changes in labor productivity must be measurable in quantitative
 
units of output,
 
The 	task of securing appropriate information on labor productivity at the
 
physical
Hambaek mine was complicated by two factors. First, lack of data on 

units of output per worker required using wages as a proxy. Second, the nature
 
of the production process made it difficult to match specific workers with
 
specific work tasks and, consequently, to measure the production of individuals
 
in additive units of output. A digression describing the production process
 
will illustrate these difficulties.
 
Although individual jobs are specialized to a degree, the miners are
 
trained to perform several tasks. For example, each miner must be able and
 
1 See the hypothetical learning curve used as an example in the Pine Ridge
 
Report; Leland S. Burns, Cecil B. Thompson, and B. Khing Tjioe, Report on a Pilot
 
Study of Worker Productivity in Relation to Housing Conditions (Los Angeles:
 
The Korean
International Housing Productivity Study, 1965), Figure 1, p. 24, 

miners in both samples are producing in the time interval AB shown in the illus­
tration, As we note in Section 4.2, regression of the before-rehousing time
 
series on productivity yields no statistically significant trend for either the
 
test or the control group. Technically, during the period prior to rehousing,
 
wages fluctuated around the average for the year with a trend of zero. See
 
Appendix I for details of the statistical analysis.
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willing to perform repair and preparational work in addition to the principal
 
tasks of drilling, digging, and loading. The amount of time and effort required
 
for work preceding drilling and picking depends on circumstances such as type
 
of rock formation. Due to the heterogeneity of tasks performed, it is difficult
 
to distinguish pickers from repair workers. For these reasons, output cannot
 
be measured in wholly comparable physical units nor can individual output records
 
be strictly compared between time periods.
 
Comparability can be achieved, however, if labor productivity is measured
 
in terms of work-group performance since shifts in individual tasks tend to
 
cancel out and become "lost" in the group average. No bias is introduced into
 
the comparative measurements between control and test groups if the composition
 
of tasks is homogeneous and if each work-group is homogeneous in terms of housing
 
status. The selection of the samples reflects these considerations (Section 3,3).
 
Although output cannot be measured in physical units, earnings represent
 
a reasonable approximation of productivity since wages are paid on a piecework
 
basis. The wage rate set for an individual job depends on the nature of the task
 
and the performance level expected. The rate paid for picking, for instance,
 
depends on the difficulty of the work. Because upward picking js easier than
 
horizontal picking which, in turn, is easier than downward picking, less is
 
pail per unit for coal mined by upward picking. Similarly, because a rock for­
mation presents more problems than a sand formation, coal picked from rock
 
commands a higher wage. Since the wage system compensates for the difficulty
 
of the task, it is a good indicator of labor productivity and a workable proxy
 
for output in physical units.
 
The wage proxy has the further advantage of stating output in commensurable
 
units, The wage dollar earned for picking is comparable to the dollar earned for,
 
say, repair work, Clearly, if units of physical output were the measure of
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productivity, rather then wages, a common denominator would have to be devised
 
to reconcile the performance of diverse tasks,
 
f. Reliable data in sufficient detail must be available.
 
Several conditions at the Hambaek project indicated that ample infor­
mation, covering a sufficiently long time period, and for a sample of reasonable
 
size, was available for taking the types of measurements required for estimating
 
housing-productivity relationships. First, completion of the housing project in
 
September 1963 was sufficiently recent to insure that the necessary data would
 
still exist. Second, the ten year history of continuous operation of the mine
 
was long enough to yield ample information on output prior to rehousing. Finally,
 
there was the additional presumption that most of the current labor force had
 
work records covering an extended period and that they had passed the initial
 
learning phase and were producing at a nearly constant level, at least prior to
 
rehousing.
 
The Doe Han Coal Corporation, operator of the mine, willingly cooperated
 
in the study by providing us with ready access to primary data sources. Con­
siderable assistance was also given by the United States Operation Mission to
 
Korea which had maintained a close involvement with the housing project since
 
its inception. The Research Department of the Bank of Korea also cooperated
 
in supplying information. The assistance of these three organizations was of
 
inestimable value to this research effort. "Hard data" were supplemented by
 
interviews and field notes reflecting personal observations obtained during the
 
course of a field trip to the test site in June 1965.
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3. 2, Site Selection Procedure
 
The choice of Hambaek followed the procedures established for selection
 
of all test sites to be included in the second phase of research for the Inter­
national Housing Productivity Study, First, the list of criteria just described
 
was submitted through AID, Washington, to missions or U. S. Enbassies in most
 
developing countries, A tentative selection of potential test sites was made
 
from the responses to these queries,
 
Next, answers to detailed questions were solicited from potential parti­
cipants. Based on this set of responses, a list of promising test sites was
 
drawn up for field visits by staff members in order to discuss in detail the
 
availability and quality of needed information, to design samples if the test
 
site satisfied the conditions for a productive research effurt, and initiate
 
data collection by reliable persons or agencies,
 
The importance of the first-hand conferences with persons at prospective
 
test sites cannot be underestimated. They served two primary goals: (1) to
 
eliminate or reduce to an allowable minimum the misinterpretation of information,
 
and (2) to acquaint the research staff with local conditions in order to avoid
 
inappropriate assumptions or incorrect inferences, In addition, the conferences
 
served as a sounding board for ideas and assisted materially in explaining and
 
enlisting support for the Study. As a consequence of these meetings, substantial
 
interest in the nature and goals of the Study has been generated in Korea and
 
the other developing nations visited. Very likely, private and public in­
stitutions in these countries will continue studies based on the same, or a
 
similar, framework, hopefully with results useful to housing policy in parti­
cular and development policy in general,
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3. 3. Sample Desiqn
 
The samples were selected from the part of the population of 1,150 mine
 
workers employed continuously over the period 1962-1965. The test group popu­
lation consisted of 497 relocated miners and the control group population com­
prised the remaining 653. With the assistance of management personnel of the
 
Dae Han Coal Corporation, samples of 50 miners were chosen from each population
 
2for the test group sample and the control group sample.
 
The composition of each sample was representative of the composition of
 
tasks performed by the population. Hence both samples were stratified identically
 
except in terms of housing, Each sample was large enough to assure, with a high
 
degree of probability, that any errors of classifying a job in terms of its
 
appropriate wage would be cancelled by offsetting errors in the opposite direction.
 
The sample may be described schematically as follows:
 
Before Rehousing After Rehousing
 
Test 50 miners to Same 50 miners
 
Group be rehoused rehoused
 
Control 
Group 
50 miners not 
rehoused 
Same 50 non­
rehoused miners 
-1 0 Years 
, p 
+2 
ajo 
ow 
The work records of the control and test groups vere each analyzed for a
 
period extending from one year before (-1) to two years after (+2) rehousing.
 
2Since each sample isrepresentative of its respective population and
 due to the awkwardness of the terms, the "control group sample" and "test
 
group sample" will henceforth be referred to simply as the control group and
 
the test group.
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The productivity data of each group of workers were provided for ten day in­
tervals, The period of one year was satisfactory for estimating trends in
 
productivity during the period before the test group was rehoused. 
 Since the
 
houses were completed and occupied on September 26, 1963, the maximum period
 
available for analysis following rehousing covered about two years,
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4, TIE IMPACT OF IMPROVED HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES
 
ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
Changes in labor productivity attributable to better housing and community
 
facilities are assessed in this section. Section five considers benefits in tie
 
form of improved health. Benefits of both types cre re-estimated in monetary
 
terms in the concluding sections.
 
4.1. 	 The Measurement of Productivity.
 
Fluctuations in the total number of hours worked at the Hambaek mine are re­
lated to the availability of work and the conditions of work. Similarly, the num­
ber of hours worked by the individual miner fluctuatessharply. Over the long run,
 
however, and taking samplesof 50 workers in the aggregate, we can assume that hours
 
on the job during normal work days fluctuate within rather narrow limits. But in
 
the short run, individual productivity per time unit is volatile due to its sub­
stantial dependence on the number of hours worked, a number which, in turn, has
 
fluctuated widely. For instance, it seems reasonable to assume that if the working
 
hours for an individual paid piece rates are reduced, say, 25 percent, his Incentive
 
to work harder during fewer hours is greater for, in order to avoid a reduction in
 
income, his productivity must increase. Moreover, it is likely that work efficiency
 
declines as the number of hours worked per day increases. A high level of output
 
can be sustained more easily during a four-hour day, for example, than throughout
 
a normal work day of eight hours. In order to eliminate the influence of the number
 
of hours worked on the level of productivity per short time-unit, the weekly wages
 
earned (as adjusted from wage data for ten-day periods) were used as the measure
 
of 	labor productivity.
 
The Dae Han Coal Corporation supplied wage data divided between earnings for
 
work accomplished during normal working hours and for overtime work. These data
 
have been analyzed separately and corrected for across-the-board wage increases.
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Only earnings derived from normal working hours will be considered in the analysis
 
to follow. Real earnings during normal working hours for the average test group
 
and control group worker are graphed in Figure 2.
 
4.2. Short-term Relevant Channes in Labor Productivity.
 
Our first approximations of changes in labor productivity are initially ob­
tained by contrasting productivity during the year preceding rehousing with the
 
year following. More precise estimates, using two-year indexes for the post­
rehousing period, are developed in Section 4.4.
 
During the period prior to rehousing, the average worker in both the test
 
and control groups earned 1,690 won weekly, and there was no significant change in
 
this amount during the year.2 The averages for test and control group after re­
housing stood at 2,006 and 1,943 won respectively, or significant increases of
 
18.7 percent and 15.0 percent over the former levels. A regression of earnings
 
after rehousing yielded positive and significant trends for both groups. The
 
weekly earnings of both increased about 13.7 won each week throughout the year
 
(Table 7). Comparison of performance during the periods before and after relocation
 
revealed a significant improvement in average productivity for each group.3 This
 
finding is a strong indication that improved housing was indeed responsible for
 
bettering the work performance of the miners (Fiqure 3). dhile the differences in 
performance for the average member of each group were significant, 
a detailed examination of the output records for each of the 100 workers in the two 
samples leads to the same conclusion. During the year prior to rehousing, produc­
tion records showed increases for seven of the 50 control group workers and six of 
lInterestingly, although the Corporation assigned priority to the more pro­
ductive workers, their productivity on average was equal to the average worker not
 
rehoused.
 
2For the statistical analysis, see Appendix I.
 
3See Appendix I.
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ACTUAL EARNINGS OF AVERAGE TEST GROUP AND CONTROL GROUP WORKERS, 
ONE YEAR BEFORE AND TWO YEARS AFrER REHOUSING, 
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the 50 test group members. The picture in the following year changed substantially.
 
After rehousing, the productivity of 31 of the test group workers increased by sig­
nificant proportions while 26 of the control group members raised their productivity
 
levels substantially. The before-after changes for each of the two groups were
 
statistically significant.
 
TABLE 7. 	 SHORT-TERM LEVELS AND CHANGES IN WEEKLY EARNINGS, YEAR BEFORE AND 
AFTER REHOUSING, AVERAGE TEST AND CONTRGL GROUP WORKERS 
(in won)
 
Averaoe Test Average.Control
 
Group Worker Group Worker Difference
 
Average levels:
 
During year before rehousing 1,690 1,690 0
 
During first year afterrehousini 2,006 1,943 63
 
Difference +316 +253 63
 
Average weekly increases:
 
During year before rehousinga 0 0 0
 
During first year afterrehousinT 13.7 13.7 0
 
aRegression of the time-series data for this period yielded average
 
weekly increases of 1.93 won and 2.80 won for the test and control
 
groups respectively with corresponding standard errors of 2.37 and
 
3.78. Because the increase was statistically insignificant at 
even
 
the 68 percent level of confidence, the trend can be considered as
 
zero.
 
Another approach to evaluating the quantitative differences in the before
 
and after periods involves estimating, separately for test and control groups, the
 
time trend in the differences in weekly earnings between the year before and the
 
year after rehousing. In other words, the series regressed against time are made
 
up of the earnings of the first week following relocation less the earnings of the
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first week in the preceding year as the first observation, the difference in earn­
ings between the second week after rehousing and the second week of the prior year
 
as the second observation, and so on until the series of 52 observations reflecting
 
productivity changes spaced a year apart is complete. The analysis holds every­
4
 
thing constant -- the workers whose productivity is under consideration are the
 
same -- except the differences in housing conditions. 
The results indicate a
 
spread in wages of 11.8 won weekly per average test group worker and of 11 won per
 
week for the average control group member.5 Stated another way, the rehoused
 
miner's production record improved, on average, 11.8 won more rapidly each week
 
after rehousing than before and the typical non-rehoused miner's record showed a
 
comparative improvement of 11 won. From this and the results of the two previous
 
approaches to determining the significance of relative changes, it is apparent that
 
improved housing bore favorably on labor productivity.
 
4.3. The "Demonstration Effect" of Housing nnd Community Facilities
 
Although we have shown earlier that in the year before relocation,
 
productivity per average worker was identical for both the test and control groups,
 
occupancy priority was presumably assigned the most productive miners. If good
 
housing was regarded as desirable, it would follow that the possibility of being
 
housed in the new project would act as a powerful incentive toward greater output.
 
A host of reasons could be, and have been, advanced for the desirability of the new,
 
qualitatively superior units, not the least of which is the estimated rent value of
 
500 won per month 6 compared to the rent subsidy of 300 won foregone, or a net bonus
 
raising each family's effective living standard by 200 won monthly. That producti­
vity levels apparently were ignored in the realities of assigning preference for
 
4As will be demonstrated in Section 4.4.
 
5Both estimates are significant at the five percent level of confidence; that
 
is, the chance is at least 95 percent that the increasing spread is significantly
 
different from zero.
 
6A "shadow-priced" rent equivalent'as explained in Section 2.2.
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rehousing is irrelevant so long as the fact was not revealed to the employees. One
 
would expect the impetus, or the "demonstration effect" to remain.
 
What form might the demonstration effect take? First, assume the possibility
 
exists for rehousing in improved accommodations and, second, that the probability of
 
relocation improves with increases in productivity. Given these assumptions, it
 
would be expected that the non-rehoused would stimulate their own efforts toward
 
greater output, hence improving their chance of securing a new housing unit. If
 
true, the productivity trend of the control group would be likely to approximate
 
the pattern of the test group.
 
The estimates developed in the previous sub-section generally confirm these
 
assumptions. Starting from identical levels of output at the moment of rehousing,
 
both groups substantially improved output during the first year following, although
 
the test group's record on this count was marginally superior. The benefits of
 
housing are clearly not restricted to the rehoused.
 
The demonstration effect multiplier is a product of two measures, (1) the
 
ratio of non-rehoused to rehoused workers, which depends on the number of housing
 
units available for occupancy, and (2) the perceived probability of rehousing,
 
which is equivalent to the relative Increases in income or productivity of the
 
non-rehoused compared to the rehoused. An example drawing on data from this case
 
will illustrate.
 
For the sake of simplification, suppose that each worker seeking a better
 
house perceives absolute probability of rehousing if his work record is competitive
 
with the average worker currently occupying a house in the project. Next, 497
 
superior units are currently occupied leaving 6387 workers as potential candidates,
 
or 1,28 unrehoused per rehoused family. The 630 succeed in increasing their average
 
7Based on the average number of miners during 1963 and 1964 (Table 1).
 
31
 
weekly productivity 253 won per week compared to the year before the housing pro­
ject was available for occupancy, but still short of the increase of 316 attained
 
by those rehoused. The probability of rehousing, or the "income ratio", is .8.
 
The product of the two ratios is the demonstration effect multiplier; that is,
 
1.28 x .8 = 1.02. Hence, each won increase in earnings of the currently rehoused
 
generates 1.02 won in the form of additional earnings for the non-rehoused workers.
 
Disturbing conclusions result if all of the above assumptions are maintained
 
as constants, but the proportion rehoused (or its complement, the proportion still
 
unrehoused) is allowed to vary. The size of the multiplier is inversely related to
 
the proportion rehoused or positive with respect to the ratio of unrehoused to re­
housed. Suppose that instead of 497 dwellings available for 1,135 workers, there 
are, as a first example, only 200 and, as a second illustration, 1,000. The re­
spective multipliers are calculated as follows: 
Income ratio or x Proportion = Demonstration effect 
probability factor unrehoused multiplier 
1) 253/316 x 1,135 - 200 = 3.74 
200 
2) 253/316 x 1,135 - 1,000= 1.08 
1,000 
Consequently, the multiplier tends to disappear as the proportion remaining unre­
housed declines. When all are rehoused, the multiplier is zero or inoperative.
 
Similarly, if any term were zero -- for example, if the control group had maintain­
ed its former output level after the new housing was occupied by the rehoused, or
 
if no hope of rehousing were perceived (hence, zero probability) -- the multiplier
 
effect would also be nil. Conversely, the smaller the proportion rehoused, the
 
larger the multiplier. To illustrate with an extreme, if only one houselwns Ovail­
able and the other components of the multiplier remained unchanged, the multiplier
 
would be a fantastic 7711 Clearly, the assumption of holding constant the
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probability of housing and the income ratio is inappropriate. To return to the ex­
treme, if only a single unit was built, the probability of housing would be per­
ceived as zero or nearly zero and, due to the interdependence between probability
 
and the 	"income ratio", it is likely that the latter would disappear. Since only a
 
single estimate of the "Income ratio" is available, it is impossible to estimate
 
with any degree of accuracy the changes in the multiplier deriving from changes in
 
the proportion of workers to be accommodated or the optimal number of housing units
 
to be constructed. However, the existence of the demonstration effect is
 
sufficiently unique in housing research to argue for more detailed investigation.
 
Finally, the scope as well as the size of the demonstration effect multi­
plier cannot be fully measured. The demonstration effect likely extends to the
 
indirect workers, the 125-137 administrative workers, particularly if they share
 
the opportunity for rehousing.
 
4.4. 	 Longer-term Relevant Changes in Labor Productivity
 
How persistent over time are the relevant labor productivity changes? What
 
are the limits to change both in terms of time and the worker's capacity to pro­
duce? These are the principal questions addressed next. The analysis of this sub­
section extends to a two-year period the earlier examination covering one year of
 
post-rehousing performance.
 
Earnings of both the test and control groups increased slightly during the
 
first half-year following rehousing and sharply during the next four months. Dur­
ing the second year, earnings leveled off to repeat the pattern of the year prior
 
to rehousing. In other words, the productivity trend for the second post-housing
 
year was roughly horizontal (or, with zero increase per unit time), but at a
 
substantially higher level than before rehousing. The year between, the period of
 
rapid development in output, bridged the two levels with growth closely approximat­
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ing the logistic curve described in Figure 4. In answer to the first question,
 
after an initial rapid increase, productivity leveled off at a higher plateau or
 
capacity limit.
 
This limit is estimated at 2,216 won per week for the average test group
 
worker and 2,145 for the average control group member. Based on statistical fits
 
to a logistic curve, wages remained constant after the limit was attained with no
 
indications of subsequent decline.
 
After the productivity of the test group attained and stabilized at Its new
 
limit, earnings per week were 2,216 won compared to 1,690 won during the pre­
rehousing period, or a relevant increase of 31 percent. The productivity record of
 
the average control group worker developed similarly, increasing to a stabilized
 
level of 2,147 won, 27 percent greater than the earlier level. This pattern was
 
consistent with the assumed parallel behavior of the control and test group in
 
their competition for housing in the project. The estimates are summarized in
 
Table 8 and graphed in Figure 5.
 
TABLE B. LONG-TERM AVERAGE ACTUAL AND EXPECTED WEEKLY EARNINGS AFTER 
REHOUSING, TEST AND CONTROL GROUP WORKERS 
Weekly Earnings During Second Average Test Average Control
 
Year After Rehousing Group Worker Group Worker
 
Estimated earnings 2,216 2,145
 
Expected earningsa 1,690 1,690
 
Relevant earnings 526 455
 
Percent increase 31.1 
 26.9
 
aDefined as the level expected if rehousing had not occurred. In
 
the absence of the new project, it would be assumed that past
 
levels of output would persist in the future, consequently the
 
expected value is the before-rehousing level.
 
4t Estimates are developed in Appendix I.
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FIGURE 4: TRENDS OF WEEKLY EARNINGS, AVERAGE TEST GROUP AND CONTROL GROUP WORKERS, ONE YEAR
 
BEFORE.AND TWO YEARS AFTER REHOUSING- ... . .
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The earnings differences are truly relevant to housing and the community
 
facilities complement only if the ceteris parihus assumption holds. 
In addition
 
to information on 
the constancy of work conditions noted earlier, additional evi­
dence supporting the assumption may be gleaned from an 
analysis of performance
 
during overtime. 
Due to changes over time in the total amount of overtime work
 
for both groups, the proper measure is output per overtime hour worked. Com­
paring the second year following housing 
-- the interval in which productivity
 
during normal work hours stabilized -- with the year before rehousing yields the
 
following:
 
Mean Outnut per Cvertime Hour Difference Standard
 
in Error
Average Year Before Second Year Mean

Worker Rehousing After Rehousing 
of
 
Gutput Difference
 
Test group 49.321 72.233 22.912 10.391
 
Control group 48.932 60.466 
 11.534 13.765
 
Because of the high standard error, the difference for the average control
 
group worker is insignificant. In contrast, the average test group worker's
 
23 won increase is significant. If exogenous factors, i.e., any change other
 
than housing affecting productivity, had been operative, the effect should show
 
up in the behavior of both groups. 
That it did not, leads us to accept the
 
assumption as 
realistic and, further, indicates that the earnings differences are
 
properly attributed to housing.
 
As a final piece of evidence, 
-;e have estimated that during normal work
 
hours, the productivity of the average test group worker exceeded that of his
 
control group counterpart by a statistically significant margin during 80 percent
 
of the two-year post-rehousing period.9
 
The estimates of increases in earnings and productivity take on added
 
meaning when compared to benchmarks. 
Total output of coal in Korea increased
 
8.6 percent in 1964 over the previous year and, simultaneously, output per
 
9See Appendix Id,
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rn3n-hour increased six percent, or a magnitude about one-fifth the flambaek in­
crease. 10  Yet, if our estimates seem astonishingly high, they become relatively
 
modest by comparison with some of the more spectacular productivity gains register­
ed elsewhere. In one extreme instance, a new incentive scheme instituted by
 
Bethlehem Steel Company yielded a 40 percent increase in efficiency. 11
 
Comparison of each group's relevant earnings (Table 8), suggests that the
 
psychological response to better housing and community facilities accounted for
 
the substantial share of the improvement in productivity and earnings (455 of the
 
526 won increase) while the remaining 71 won increase may be attributed to the
 
material or physical housing improvement per se. The distinction between materi­
al and immaterial transmissions of labor productivity change is cloudy, In an
 
earlier report, 12 we differentiated between physiological and psychological
 
responses to changed housing circumstances as related to chanqes in mental atti­
tude toward work compared to the ability to work more time and more efficiently
 
per unit of time due to improved physical health. Similarly, material effects
 
reflect reduced incidences of illness or accidents in response to better hygenic
 
conditions of newer, safer, 
more sanitary homes. The immaterial effects refer to
 
improved morale and incentive resulting from superior housing.
 
As a digression, it is interesting to note that the immaterial or psycho­
logical effect played a minor role in influencing productivity increases in the
 
Pilot Study at the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, 13 and the material effects
 
dominated. The situation was the reverse at Ilambaek due perhaps to two factors.
 
First, competition for a relatively smaller supply of good housing was keener at
 
Ilambaek. Second, the Doe han management appeared to assume a more benevolent
 
1OThe Bank of Korea, ',;onthly Statistical Review, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (April 1965), 
p. 87.
 
11Fenninger, Lawrence, Jr., "The Establishment of Norms Under Incentive Systems

in the Basic Steel Industry in the United States," in John T, Dunlop and V. P. 
Diotchencho, Labor Productivity (New York: 1cGra,v-Hill Book Co., 1964), 
pp. 271-72.
 
12 1urns, et Lli, op. ci .. , pp. 21, 22. 
13Ibid. 38
 
posture toward its employees. If the material factor can be separated from the
 
immaterial, it would seem that this manifestation of interest may have been as
 
powerful an incentive toward greater efficiency as the housing improvement
 
itself. Conceivably too, other steps taken by management to raise living
 
standards could yield results of no less consequence.
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5. THE IMPACT OF IMPROVED HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES ON HEALTH 
The positive relation between housing quality and health quality has Leon
 
subjected to careful study but, to our knowledge, little is known about the re­
lation in monetary terms. 
 This section examines the relationship between
 
housing and health, with.the latter referring to circumstances requiring pre­
ventive or curative medical attention. In Section 6, the benefits of housing
 
to health are calculated in monetary terms compatible with units used to
 
measure other benefits.
 
5. 1. The Measurement of Health Effects
 
While labor productivity changes were measured using employed persons as
 
units for observation, samples for measuring health effects were drawn from a
 
population consisting of all persons rehoused with a control group sample con­
sisting of nonrehoused persons. The Dae Han Coal Corporation supplied data on
 
health conditions for a test group of 197 rehoused persons and a control group
 
consisting of 287 covering one year before and a year after rehousing. Except
 
that the time period is shorter by a year, the larger random samples for health
 
measurements, compared to the samples for labor productivity measurements, mean
 
that any conclusions are more firmly grounded with smaller probabilities that
 
purely incidental factors govern.
 
Our information was obtained from records of the only hospital in HambaeR
 
offering health and medical care. The distinction is drawn between outpatient
 
and inpatient admissions with the former referring to clinical treatment and
 
the latter to more extended care requiring hospitalization. However, the data
 
exclude illnesses and accidents for which medical care was not sought at the
 
hospital.
 
1For a comprehensive review and bibliography of such studies, see e.g.,
 
Schorr, op. cit.
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5o 2, Relevant Changes in Health
 
The hypothesis under consideration is that better quality housing is
 
positively associated with improvements in health. Acceptance of the hypothesis
 
is based on two conditions, First, the improvement in health must be positive
 
with respect to the improvement in housing quality. 
Second, the improvement
 
must be of statistically significant dimensions, 
A relative improvement in
 
health conditions after rehousing is not sufficient proof that the change in
 
housing conditions is responsible. The improvement may result from other factors
 
such as a concerted health education program. Only comparison with a control
 
group which differs strictly in terms of housing conditions provides convincing
 
evidence that housing, not other factors, was responsible for health improvements,
 
TABLE 9. ACTUAL NUMBER OF HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS BEFORE AND AFTER REHOUSING1
 
TEST AND CONTROL GROUPS
 
Type of Admission Test Group Control Group Total 
Outpatient: 
Before Rehousing 527 589 1?116 
After Rehousing 442 602 1,044 
Change (after less before) -85 +13 -72 
Inpatient: (days of 
hospitalization) 
Before Rehousing 25 51 76 
After Rehousing 11 73 84 
Change (after less before) 
-14 +22 +8 
Number in Sample 197 287 
 484
 
If the control group sample is truly representative of all persons not
 
in the housing project, their admissions records will reveal the importance of
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non-housing factors influencing the use of health and medical services. The
 
date inTable 9 show that these services are utilized to an increasing extent,
 
either because of increasing need, greater recognition of their wortht increased
 
Over the two year
availability, or any combination of these or other reasons. 

period, outpatient admissions among the control group of 287 persons increased
 
In ratios, the per capita number of outpatient admissions
from 589 to 602. 

rose from 2.05 (or 589/287) to 2.10 (or 602/287), an increase of 2.4 percent.
 
In contrast, outpatient admissions for the 197 test group members declined from
 
an annual level of 527 to 442, or the number per person dropped 16.4 percent
 
from 2,68 to 2024, If the test group's behavior had paralleled that of the
 
control group, the number of outpatient admissions would have increased by 11
 
visits rather than declining by 85. More precisely, the expected number of
 
outpatient admissions, or the number expected had rehousing not taken place,
 
would have climbed to 540 rather than dropping to 442. If the difference is
 
can be credited
significant, that is, not determined by random change, housing 

with the change.
 
The statistical significance of the difference was measured using a
 
chi-square testa 2 The results confirm the significance of the differences and
 
affirm the hypothesis; that is, for the test group, the difference between the
 
actual and expected number of outpatient admissions was statistically signifi­
cant. Consequently, the probability is high that the improvements were explained
 
by qualitative improvements in housing.
 
Generally similar results were obtained from the analysis of comparative
 
Aqain, the autonomous trend in
before-after data on inpatient admissions, 

Over the two-year period, inpatient admissions climbed
admissions was upward, 

2See Appendix II for the calculations.
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from 51 to 73 for the control group or *18 per capita during the year before
 
rehousing to .25 the year after. 
Among the test group, however, the annual
 
number of inpatient admissions declined from 25 to 
11, or l3 and ,06 per capita
 
before and after rehousing, respectively. 
The number of inpatient admissions
 
for the test group after rehousing would have been 36 rather than 11 
if the
 
trend had run parallel with the control group. 
Again, a chi-square test in­
dicated that the difference was of statistically significant proportions.3
 
Actual and expected values for the number of outpatient visits and 
the
 
number of days of hospitalization are summarized in Table 10 and Figure 6, The
 
number of outpatient visits was reduced about 18 percent as the result of housing.
 
Stated another way, had the new project not been built, the test groups' need
 
for clinical care would have been 18 percent greater. The relative changes
 
in the need for hospitalization are an even more dramatic improvement of 69
 
percent. 
 In other words, the actual number of days of required hospitalization
 
was 69 percent less than the number expected if better housing were not available.
 
TABLE 10. ACTUAL AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS, TEST GROUP 
Type of Admission Before RehousinQ After Rehousing L'errent 
Per Person Total Per Person Total Chante
 
Outpatient Visits:
 
Expected number of visitsa 

- - 2.73 538 +2.1
 
Actual number of visits 
 2.68 527 
 2.24 442 
-16,1.
 
Difference: actual less expected 

- -
-0.49 -96 
Inpatient Days:
 
Expected number of daysa 

- - 0.183 36 
-44.0 
Actual number of days 0.13 25 0.056 11 
-56.0 
Difference: actual less expected 
­
-0.127 -25
 
aThe expected number, or 
the number expected if rehousing had not occurred, was
 
calculated as 
the "before" level of the test group multiplied by the rate of change

of the control group after housing relative to before,
 
;See Appendix II for the calculations.
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ANNUAL NUMBER OF HOSPITAL VISITS. TEST GROUP, BEFORE AND AFTER -REHOUSING 
QOupatients: InpatientslDays: 
36 
527 538Iii{iiiiDifferenee: 2
25 
442 fee96 Difference:
96 
.. ... 
 25 
C1 
Actual Number 
[I]Expected Number 
FIGURE 6
 
Clearly, improved housing favorably affected the health conditions of
 
the rehoused families. Monetary values for the benefits are estimated in the
 
next section,
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6. THE BENEFITS OF IMPROVED HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES
 
The benefits accruing from better housing have been estimated in
 
units which are neither additive nor commensurate with costs. Increases
 
in earnings cannot be added to reductions in hospital admissions to arrive
 
at a sum for comparison with the costs of securing these benefits, While
 
index numbers have been used experimentally to reconcile differences in
 
1
 
unit measures, one of the most useful common denominators for structuring
 
benefit-cost relationships is price. In this section, benefits are esti­
mated in monetary values and classified in terms of their importance to the
 
Doe Han Coal Corporation as investor, and to the persons rehoused.
 
The classification of benefits into three categories is useful for
 
purposes of Investment planning since returns on housing investment, per­
haps the criterion an invester ranks highest, may depend on the worker's
 
own evaluation of the personal benefits related to the personal costs of
 
relocation. For example, the potential candidate for rehousing may evaluate
 
the costs of giving up his present home in excess of the anticipated benefits
 
of a new one. If the improvement in quality is not worth a rent higher
 
than he would pay for inferior accommodations, he may reject new housing.
 
Conceivably too, the higher earnings resulting from reduced absenteeism and
 
greater efficiency at work may not be sufficient to turn his decision.
 
Consequently, if costs outweigh the benefits in the calculus of the worker
 
considering relocation1 his decision would likely favor maintaining the
 
status quo. Under these circumstances, pesdmistic and unrealistic as they
 
1United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, The Level
 
of Living Index, Programme C, UNRISD/65/c.28/Rev. 1 (Geneva: The author,
 
1965), processed.
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are, no rents would be generated and the other benefits would never mater­
ialize for the investor.
 
As the example illustrates, housing is a good with both consumption 
and production properties. Consumption properties are measured by living 
standards. If rents paid are a valid indicator of housing utility, the 
consumption value of a new house compared to an old one would roughly be 
the difference in rents between the two. In the Hambaek case, the renters 
forsook s rent subsidy in favor of gaining rent-free accommodations. The 
benefit to the relocated of the superior accommodations clearly exceeded 
the foregone subaidy, an annual "cost" of 3600 won. As noted, comparable 
units rented for at least 6000 won. While the rehoused family may not have 
realized the full value of their new homes, they valued the superior accom­
modations at something in excess of -the lost subsidy. 
The production properties refer to the returns generated by the
 
investment. In the convention of capital-output analysis such returns are
 
measured solely as rents. But, as our estimates show, the returns also
 
included improvements in labor productivity which translate into added in­
come for the family, the employer, and the community. The size of these
 
returns 	is the focus of this section.
 
6.1. 	 Benefits From Changes in Labor Productivity
 
Estimates of the benefits in the form of additional income deriving
 
from increased labor productivity are calculated for the rehoused workers
 
and those not rehoused. The latter estimates are based on the "dembnstration
 
effect" (Section 4.3). Since the size of this effect and the consequent
 
benefits are partly determined by the ratio of rehoused to non-rehoused,
 
it is likely (though far from certain), that the effect's magnitude diminishes
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with increases in the number of dwelling units built. Because the nature
 
of this function is beyond the scope of this report and impossible to
 
estimate, the effect must be calculated from a single known point: the
 
ratio of families not rehoused to rehoused, 638/497 or 1.28/1. Stated
 
another way, each new dwelling unit generated benefits for 1.28 nonrehoused
 
workers in addition to the rehoused family or 2.28 families in total.
 
The money value of labor productivity benefits excludes the adjust­
ment period of the first year after rehousing. Except for this year, the
 
increase in annual income from improved labor productivity of the test
 
and control groups was 526 won and 455 won respectively (Table 7). Relevant
 
benefits from this source attributable to a single dwelling unit are the
 
weighted sum obtained as:
 
Annual income increase of one rehoused worker: ....... 526 won
 
Annual income increase of 455 won for 1.28 non-rehoused workers:582 won
 
Total annual income increase attributable to one new dwelling1108 won
 
Unless the advantages of these increases are transferred completely
 
to labor in the form of higher wages, the mine corporation also benefits
 
from the increase in labor productivity. Profits increase from scale economies
 
deriving from more effective utilization of existing capital with less than
 
proportional increases in costs. 
 Within certain limits, the size of fixed
 
capital investment, e.g., mining equipment, and fixed costs, e.g., operating
 
costs of the administration, are independent of the level of output. When
 
output increases, the size of both fixed items in the corporate budget may
 
remain unchanged but, by definition, surely do not change in equivalent
 
proportions to the change in production and earnings. 
In this particular
 
case we will consider those costs as fixed, which remain unchanged with
 
an increase in output of 28.8 percent, the average productivity increase
 
per miner.
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The increase in the net value if final product added by the mine
 
workers is equivalent to the gross increase in value added less all variable
 
non-labor inputs required for the increase. The following steps lead to the
 
estimate of value added traceable to a single new dwelling unit:
 
First, output per mine worker in 1963 and 1964 
was 372,002 and 424,175
 
won respectively.2 
Since the 1964 figure reflected the productivity increase
 
resulting from rehousing and the previous year did not, 3 1963 is the base for
 
calculating values for relevant changes. 
 We have estimated that improved
 
housing was responsible for increasing the labor productivity of the rehoused
 
and non-rehoused 31 and 27 percent respectively (Table 8). The average
 
productivity increase for all 
miners, weighted by the relative numbers of
 
rehoused and non-rehoused, is 28.8 percent. 
 The value of production per miner
 
increased 107,160 won or 28.6 percent over 372,002. 
This amount includes
 
variable costs which must be deducted to determine the net relevant benefit.
 
Second, in the absence of precise accounting figures for the Dae
 
Han Corporation's Hambaek operation, variable costs 
are estimated from
 
averages for the Korean coal i:idustry (Table 11). Sales costs are largely
 
variable. Because the data 
source fails to reveal whether the sales costs
 
item contains any fixed elements, it is assumed to be composed entirely
 
of variable elements. 
 This assumption, if false, leads to an underestimate
 
of value added and, consequently, of the size of the relevant benefit.
 
Other operating costs, consist of general administrative charges such 
as
 
salaries and expenses of administrative personnel, office equipment, and
 
general expenses. Within limits, these costs are unaffected by changes
 
2Ratio of total production to total number of production workers (Tables 1 and 2). 
3Changes in labor productivity during the brief period from the
 
relocation date (September 26, 1963) through the balance of the calendar
 
year were negligible.
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TABLE 11. SELECTED OPERATING RATIOS, THE KOREAN COAL INDUSTRY-;
 
Sales Costs Other Operating Operating Profit to
 
Year to Net Sales Costs to Net Sales Net Sales
 
1961 74.11% 14.10% 11.79%
 
1962 90.18% 5.77% 4.05%
 
Mean 82.14% 9.94% 7.92%
 
a 	Each row sums to 100 percent. Sales and other operating costs equal
 
total rperating costs.
 
Source: 	 Research Department, Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics Yearbook,
 
1964 (Se3ul: The author, 1964), pp. 172-177.
 
in the level of production. The same applies to the profit margin (7.92%)
 
which is largely independent of output level within reasonable limits.
 
Since the increase in production of the Hambaek mine resulting from the
 
productivity increase would affect total Korean coal production by a spare
 
1.5 percent, the affect or coal prices and, therefore, on profits would
 
be of negligible importance.
 
Third, deducting variable costs of 88,021 won (.8214 x 107,160)
 
from the increase in gross value added per worker (107,160 won) yields a
 
net increase in value added of 19,139 won per miner. Fourth, since there
 
were 1.28 nonrehoused workers per rehoused worker, and one rehoused worker
 
in each new house, the relevant benefit per dwelling is 2.28 times the
 
increase in net value added per miner, or 43,632 won.
 
In sum, the derivation of relevant increases in value added per new
 
dwelling 	unit is as follows:
 
1. 	Increase in gross value added (total production) per miner. . .107,160won 
Obtained as the product of (a) the weighted average
 
increase in production per miner, 1963-1964 (28.8 percent),
 
and (b) production per miner, 1963 (372,082 won)
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2. Less variable costs ... ................. . . . . . 88,021 won
 
Obtained as the product of (a) the mean ratio of sales
 
costs to net sales (82.14 percent), and (b) the in­
zrease in gross value added per miner (107,160 won)
 
3. Equals the increase in net value added per miner. . . . . . 19,139 won 
....... 43,632 won
 
Obtained as the product of (a) the increase in net value
 
added per miner (19,139 won), and (b) the ratio of the
 
number of miners to the number of new dwelling units (2.28)
 
4. Increase in net value added per dwelling unit 

If the estimates of the share of increased labor productivity
 
Gttributable to better quality housing during 1963 were extrapolated to
 
1965, total output would be 739 million won rather than 504 million won,
 
the actual level (Table 2). The difference can be explained by reduced
 
demand for Hambaek coal during the latter year. The decrease could be
 
accommodated either by reducing overtime work (which occurred) or by lay­
offs. Either alternative would be reasonable even with labor productivity
 
increases. While the benefits to employees would still accrue in the form
 
a result of
of increased earnings, income for the region would decline as 

the decrease in sales. However, an already high unemployment rate would
 
Over the longer period,
be further aggravated in the short-run by lay-offs. 

capital would be used more intensively with new investments adjusted to
 
reflect anticipated (reduced) demands for final product. Consequently, in
 
the short run, the relevant increases in value added can be realized only
 
if demand expands sufficiently to accommodate productivity increases.
 
Otherwise, the advantages accrue only in the long run.
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6.2. Benefits From Chanaes in Health
 
Imputing money values to the benefits of better health deriving from
 
improved housing is not an easy task. Merely noting that the number of
 
outpatient admissions dropped .49 per annum and the number of days of
 
hospitalization was .127 fewer than if rehousing had not occurred, is in­
sufficient. The full money value of these improvements in health
 
attributable to better housing can be measured only partially by the direct
 
cost savings from reduced need for clinical and hospital care, Yet a re­
duction to money units is required for comparison with other benefits and
 
the most indicative proxy is savings in the cost of medical and health care.
 
The Hambaek case is somewhat unique since the principal burden of
 
medical costs is borne by the Corporation. Medical care is provided at no
 
charge to employees and families are required to pay only the costs of
 
medicines, a negligible share of the total medical bill. Costs per out­
4
 
patient visit and inpatient day are 448 and 647 won respectively. To
 
arrive at an estimate of the changes per household, the per capita changes
 
developed in Table 10 must be multiplied by six, the number of persons in
 
the average Hambaek family. Per household, the changes are reductions of
 
2.94 outpatient visits (6 x 0.49) and 0.762 days of hospitalization (6 x 0.127.
 
In monetary terms, relevant annual savings in the need for clinical care and
 
hospitalization total to 1,810 won per family, In sum, the total is derived
 
as follows:
 
For outpatients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,317 won 
Obtained as the product of (a) the relevant change in annual 
number of clinical admissions per person (0,49), the number 
of persons per family (6), and (b) the cost per clinical visit 
(448 won) 
4 For details, see Appendix III.
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For inpatients . . . . . . . . . . . . .0. . . . . . . . . . 493 won 
Obtained as the product of (a)the relevant change in number of
 
days hospitalized per person (0.127), (b)the number of persons
 
per family (6), and (c)the cost per hospital day (647 won)
 
Total money value of reduction in medical costs. . . . . . . . . 1,810 won 
These estimates assume that all costs of providing medical care
 
are variable and consequently that capacity of the hospital and clinic
 
can be adjusted with changes in the need for medical and health services.
 
Alternatively, it must be assumed that the capacity of the hospital and
 
medical services is'insufficient to satisfy need. Otherwise, reductions
 
in the demand for services would generate excess capacity and the relevant
 
benefits would fail to materialize.
 
The assumptions are invalid and the benefits would be overestimated,
 
only in the very short run. Over the long run, all costs become variable
 
since capacity can be adjusted to tile required level. Hence, if the need
 
for medical services declines as the result of improvements in housing or
 
in other facilities improving environmental health, the budget for hospital
 
and clinical services can be reduced correspondingly.
 
When medical and health costs are charged directly to the patient,
 
the benefits from cost reductions are reflected in his personal budget.
 
Reductions in costs for care provided at public expense or by the corporate
 
employer, as in the Hambaek case, accrue to the public or corporate
 
treasury. Except for costs of medicine,the benefactor in this instance
 
is the Corporation.
 
6.3. Allocation of Benefits
 
In this section, we have imputed monetary values to a series of
 
benefits attributable to improved housing. For certain benefits, such as
 
the increase in value added and the reduction in the need for medical care,
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it can be argued that true values are not fully realized in the short run;
 
this however, is no reason for disregarding such benefits, The same would
 
hold for technological developments where short run adjustments militate
 
against full realization of returns until the distant future.
 
The values for benefits, measured in 1963 prices and with corrections
 
for across-the-board waqe increases are listed in Table 12, The list of
 
benefits assessed here is not comprehensive and include only those that
 
could be measured without launching a substantially more ambitious data
 
collection effort. Among the benefits excluded are those generated by
 
increased exposure to education, an omission necessitated by the lack of
 
data on school performance or attendance of the rehoused children.
5
 
TABLE 12. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL RELEVANT BENEFITS PER DWELLING UNIT 
ALLOCATED BETVEEN CORPORATION AND WORKERS 
(in won of 1963) 
Corporation Workers 
Type of benefit Income Income Income Income 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
House rents:
 
Elimination of subsidy 3,600 3,600
 
Rent paid 0 6,000
 
Earnings 1,108 1,108
 
Value added 43,632
 
Medical costs 1810
 
Total net increase 47,934 3,508
 
5FOr measurements of these benefits related to improved housinq, see 
Leland S. Burns, "Case Study of a Cost-Benefit Analysis of Improved Housing",
 
paper prepared for the Meeting of Experts on Cost-Benefit Analysis of Social
 
Projects, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Rennes,
 
France, September 26-October 2, 1965, processed.
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7. AN EVALUATION OF INVESTMENT IN HDUSIN AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES
 
Investment in housing is customarily justified on social grounds with
 
little relevance to economic growth. Benefits of the type we have estimated
 
in the previous sections are traditionally ignored in evaluating returns to
 
housing, In this section, we compare the economic feasibility of investment in
 
housing and community facilities with alternative investment possibilities in Korea.
 
An important and frequently used investment criterion isthe comparison of
 
benefits to costs. More often than not, benefit-cost analyses are limited to
 
considering the rationality of an investment in isolation, Because it is
 
difficult to take account of the full range of benefits, indirect returns, 
or
 
macro-economic returns, are frequently ignored. Moreover, the costs of the
 
project under consideration may be benefits to another project, yet the costs
 
decrease the subject project's attractiveness to the investor but contribute
 
to the welfare of the community-at-large.
 
Capital-output analysis, which ignores non-capital costs and interest, is
 
often a preferable criterion for evaluating profitability in terms of the
 
macro-, as well as the micro-, economy. The ratio measures the number of units
 
of capital required to generate one unit of output per annum or the number of
 
years required to recapture capital,
 
Although an appropriate interest rate isdifficult to establish due to
 
large fluctuations vver time and among investment alternatives, rough approxi­
mations will be made for discounting streams of future returns inovder to
 
compare the present value of benefits with costs. Because the estimates are
 
necessarily crude, a second set of calculations will be made using capital-outp,,t
 
ratios, Each set of calculations will yield certain unique insights of use to in.­
vestment planning and permit comparisons between housing and other investment
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7. 1. Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Investment in Housing and Community Facilities
 
Relevant benefits of an investment in one housing unit have been esti­
mated at 51,442 won per annum following an adjustment period of one year. Of
 
this amount, 47,934 won accrued to the Corporation and were largely due to a
 
substantial increase in value added (43,632 won) deriving from increases in
 
labor productivity. The balance of 3,508 accrued to the worker in the form of
 
a higher living standard deriving, in turn, from increased earnings and improved
 
housing (Table 12).
 
Costs were of two types, capital and operating. Operating costs, or
 
items recurring over the useful life of the project, consist of depreciation,
 
interest charges, and costs of administration. Average capital cost per unit
 
was 149,781 won (Section 2.2). Based on the quality of the structure, the
 
average lifetime of these dwellings can be conservatively estimated at 40 years.
 
Using straight-line depreciation, the value of the structure 140,045 won,
 
(exclusive of land value of 9,736 won), would decline an average of 2.5 percent
 
annually, or 3,501 won.
 
As noted earlier (Section 2.2), the housing project included related
 
community facilities. The costs of these facilities, together with the costs
 
of land, roads, and electrical and water distribution systems, represented about
 
43 percent of the investment per dwelling. The costs of community facilities
 
must be included as a part of the capital costs of housing since both investments
 
occurred simultaneously, and both improved housing and community facilities may
 
have reacted favorably on labor productivity. However, since the improvement In
 
community facilities was moderate compared to the improvement in housing, it
 
seems likely that housing had a substantially greater impact on productivity.
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Further, as Figure 1 indicates, the new community facilities together
 
with the new residential community were completely separate and located at some
 
distance from the original community of Hambaek. For this reason, they were
 
relatively inaccessible to the non-rehoused population and can therefore hardly
 
be considered to have any material effect on the productivity level of the non­
rehoused population,
 
Due to lack of more detailed data, we shall arbitrarily assume that
 
community facilities accounted for a conservative 20 percent in addition to the
 
construction costs per dwelling with land (149,781 won). 
 We assume further
 
that depreciation of these facilities can be neglected since the bulk of costs
 
are for land. Thus, the total investment per dwelling, and the
 
proportional share of community facilities, is 179,737 won (120 percent of
 
149,781 won).
 
The average interest paid on capital was 4 percent (Section 2.2). How­
ever, the rate reflects a substantial element of subsidy in the counterpart
 
loan rather than the market rate. Though there is considerable controversy
 
over the proper rate to apply to investment projects in less developed countries,
 
the weight of evidence suggests about ten percent.l The rate we have chosen,
 
15 percent, is conservative by these standards and represents a rough average
 
of 1963 interest rates in Korea which fluctuated between eight and twenty
 
percent (Table 13). Over the term of the loan for a dwelling plus its share
 
In community facilities of 179,737 won, average unpaid principal outstanding
 
represents half the capital cost of the new asset yearly or 89,869 won. 
At
 
the shadow price rate of 15 percent, the yearly interest charges for this in­
vestment is 13,480 won.
 
ICf. Jan Tinbergen, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Social Projects (Geneva:
 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1066), and
 
Jack Hirschleifer, James C. Deflaven and Jerome D, Mlilliman, Water Supply:

Economics, Technology, and Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960),
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TABLE 13. PREVAILING INTEREST RATES FOR SELECTED TYPES OF CREDIT, KOREA, MAY 1963
 
Type Rate
 
(percent)
 
Loans for the purchase of aid goods 13.87
 
Loans for foreign trade 8.03
 
Loans on bills 15.70
 
Discounts on bills 13.87
 
Overdrafts 18.25
 
Loans overdue 20,00
 
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review, May 17, 1963.
 
Because data on administrative and related costs are unavailable, this
 
amount is arbitrarily estimated at ten percent of depreciation and Interest.
 
The estimate is likely conservative since costs of maintenance, which include
 
administrative costs, are paid by tenants.
 
Annual operating costs of 18,679 won per dwelling unit are itemized as
 
follows:
 
Depreciation (.025 x lA0,045 won) . . . . . . . . o 3,501 won
 
Interest costs (.15 x 179,737/2) . . . . . . . . . . 13,480 won
 
Administrative and related costs 
(,10 x (13,480 + 3,501)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,698 won 
Total . . . . a . , . * . . . . . . 18,679 won* * 

Relevant annual benefits related to total capital invested are 16.3 percent for 
the Corporation and 18.2 percent for the community-at-large.2 The derivation 
is as follows: 
For the For the
 
Corporation Community-at-Larqe
 
Total annual relevant benefits 47,934 won 51,442 won
 
Total annual operating costs 18,679 won 18,679 won
 
Relevant benefits less operating costs 29,255 won 32,763 won
 
As a percent of total capital invested
 
(179,737 won) 16.3 18.2
 
2The sum of relevant benefits accruing to the Corporation and the worker
 
(Table 12). 57
 
The return of 16.3 percent is doubly impressive when contrasted to
 
average profit rates for industrial investments in Korea, For example, the
 
average rates for mining and manufacturing were, respectively, 10.2 and 7.2
 
in 1961 and 1962. Ratios listed by detailed sectors in Table 14, and
 
ranging from 3.33 to 16,55 percent, are based only on direct returns exclusive
 
of indirect benefits accruing to other investors. The comparison indicates
 
clearly and dramatically the profitability of the housing project to the Dae Han
 
Corporation,
 
Several factors account for the marked difference between the rate of
 
return from the Hambaek project and the averages for alternative investments,
 
Scale economies, or the more efficient utilization of existing investment, are
 
one important reason. The externalities to the Dae Han Corporation, principally
 
in the form of substantial increases in value added, are generated without
 
additional direct investment in plant and equipment, and with less than pro­
portional increases in operating costs principally due to the fixed cost com­
ponent. This advantage is Inherent in capital-deepening investment, or invest­
ment made expressly for improving labor productivity,
 
Another reason accounting for the substantially higher rates of return
 
from the housing investment derives from the mine's high operating ratio, or
 
production level relative to plant capacity. 3 This can be contrasted with
 
estimates for manufacturing ranging between two and 124 percent of capacity,
 
depending on time and type of manufacture (Table 15). If the ratio is low,
 
existing capital Is inefficiently utilized, According to the Bank of Korea,
 
insufficient supplies of raw materials caused by foreign exchange scarcities
 
3Although data for calcubting the mine's operating ratio were not
 
available, the use of overtime to meet increased demands would suggest the
 
ratio is high,
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TABLE 14. RATIOS OF NET PROFIT TO GROSS CAPITAL, PRINCIPAL MINING
 
AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS, KOREA, 1961 and 1962
 
Classification 

Coal 

Metals 

Stone quarrying 

Non-metal 

Food 

Beverage 

Textile 

Footwear, apparel, etc. 

Wood and cork 

Furniture and fixtures 

Paper and paper products 

Printing and publishing 

Leather and leather products 

Rubber products 

Chemical and chemical products 

Petroleum and coal products 

Clay, glass, and stone products 

Basic metal 

Metal products 

iachinery 

Electrical machinery and
 
appliances 

Transport equipment 

Ratio
 
9.63
 
16.55
 
7.64
 
4.83
 
8.22
 
9.66
 
7.03
 
7.14
 
11.14
 
11.57
 
3.33
 
7.05
 
5.39
 
8.00
 
6.67
 
11.84
 
6.26
 
5.22
 
6.04
 
8.35
 
5.93
 
5.34
 
Source: Research Department, Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics
 
Yearbook 1964, p. 176.
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TABLE 15. OPERATING RATIOS, PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURING SECTORS,
 
KOREA, 1961-1965 (in percents)
 
1961 1962 1963 1964 19658
 
Refined sugar 
 26.1 21.8 16.2 7.0 9.4
 
Wheat flour 23.3 36.4 56.8 27.5 21.9
 
Ethyl alcohol 35.2 22.0 21.9 
 17.6 23.8
 
Cotton cloth 
 49.8 56.4 56.5 60.8 68.7
 
Cotton yarn 66.0 
 78.2 76.3 77.7 71.4 
Rayon cloth 84.7 93.2 66.8 73.0 93.2 
Nylon n.a. n.a. 8.9 7.7 101.5 
Newsprint 90.8 98.9 80.8
78.6 82.7
 
Wood free paper n.a. n,a, 94.2
87.4 98.9
 
Rubber shoes 58.4 73.3 80.3
74.3 50.1
 
Tires 
 53.4 59.7 49.9 52.8 
 46.4
 
Oxygen 66.8 114.6
91.5 119.2 100.3
 
Industrial explosives 52.1 75.0 43.3 30.8 33.3
 
Fertilizer 
 76.1 95.6 57.5 83.0 96.0
 
Soap 35.1 50.0 52.4
59.9 40.6
 
Paint 19.4 27.8 18.7
14.6 19.0
 
Refined oil 
 n.a. n.a. 43.7
n.a. 80.4
 
Flat Glass 123.9 51.8 92.6
97.6 99.4
 
Cement 
 72.6 109.7 108.1 72.2 47.4
 
Pig iron 9.1 n.a. 8.4 2.0 18.1
 
Steel ingots 67.7 104.5 86.4 
 43.7 15.2
 
Steel bar n.a. n.a. 53.3 22.3 16.8
 
Electrolytic copper 59.1 100.0 100.0 
 107.7 66.7
 
Uninsulated electric wire 20.0 
 45.7 45.7 73.3 53.3
 
Bicycles 26.6 41.0 25.8
21.0 28.2
 
Fire bricks 29.8 45.1 62.2
48.5 59.0
 
Plywood n.a. n.a. 91.2
83.8 95.5
 
Nails 
 27.0 23.0 58.1 47.3 27.0
 
aJanuary - March only.
 
Source: Research Department, Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 1964,
 
p. 176.
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was a major cause contributing to generally low rates of utilization. Industries
 
using capacity at a low rate due to input shortages would be poor choices
 
for housing projects or for other investments of the capital-deepening type
 
if improvements in loborproductivity were expected. The ideal industry is one
 
where production bottle-necks are created only by a qualitatively or
 
quantitatively short supply of labor. Except that the demand for Hambaek
 
coal is unstable and mainly domestic and, as a consequence, the demand for
 
labor may be uneven, the Hambaek mine was close to ideal in this respect.
 
7. 2. Capital-Output Analysis of the Investment in Housing and Community Facilities
 
Defining housing output as the sum of relevant benefits accruing to the
 
community-at-large (51,442 won), rather than in the narrower sense as
 
exclusively rents, and capital as the amount of investment in a housing unit
 
plus its share in community facilities required to generate these benefits
 
(179,737 won), yields a capital-output ratio of 3.49. Stated two ways,
 
the amount of won required for producing one won output each year is 3.49,
 
or the capital invested will be recaptured by the community-at-large in 3.49
 
years. Because the output side includes returns earned by the workers in
 
addition to the investing Corporation, the ratio will be somewhat higher for
 
the Corporation, hence the capital recapture period is somewhat longer
 
(about four years). Since the project is viewed as an instrument for development
 
of the macro-economy, rather than for the sole profit of the investor, this
 
allocation problem disappears.
 
The ratio of 3.49 compares favorably with alternative investments.
 
Chenery and Strout have estimated the incremental capital-output ratio for
 
Korea at an average of 3.74 for the period 1960-1964.9 The average estimated
 
91o111s B. Chenery and Alan 5. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic
 
Development," A.I.D. Discussion Paper Number 7, Office of Program Coordination,
 
A.I.D., June, 1965, processed, Table A-1.
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0.00 
by Ki Choon Han for the same period was 3.42.
0 His estimates, listed in Table
 
The annual
 
16, show rather sharp annual fluctuations between 1954 and 1964. 

a high of nearly

ratio ranged over the decade from a low of 1.64 in 1964 to 

in 1956, an extreme attributed to the bad harvest of that 
year.
 
The average ratio also varied by industry, as would be expected
 
are
 
(Table 17). The variations, like those in the net profit ratios (Table 
14), 

Other things equal, a low
 in part explained by different operating ratios. 

operating ratio and, consequently, under-utilization of plant 
and equipment
 
would produce a high ratio of capital to output.
 
The comparatively high capital-output ratio for "ownership 
of
 
dwellings" (6.98) closely approximates the early ratio developed by Leontief
 
rents
Both measures define output only as 
for the American economy (7.1). 1 
earned by the investor. Applying this rule to the Hambaek project would yield 
2 if the rents were shadow-priced , or estimates of 25 (or 149,781/6,000)
 
41.6 (149,761/3,600) if returns were defined in terms of savings in rent
 
In either case, a narrow construction which considers housing as
 subsidy. 

investment only for consumption purposes, is singularly myopic and 
of course
 
places housing in a most*unattractive position. Defining output more broadly,
 
and more properly, as indirect as well as direct returns, not only 
puts housing
 
a decidedly more favorable competitive position for investment resources
 in 

10 Ki Choon Han, "Capital-Output Ratio in Korea -- A Trial," Quarterly
 
Economic Research, June 1964, Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea.
 
11 assily Leontief and others, Studies in the Structure of 1th American
 
Economy (New York: Oxford University Piess, 1955), pp. 220-221.
 
12The estimates are of course somewhat exaggerated by comparing the
 
capital required for a new, undepreciated dwelling with the monthly rent
 
assumed at 500 won for a comparable older house.
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TABLE 16. MARGINAL CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIOS, KOREA, 1954-1964
 
Year Ratio
 
1954 1.69
 
1955 1.80
 
1956 7.91a
 
1957 1.84
 
1958 1.91
 
1959 2.59
 
1960 7.32a
 
1961 2.36
 
1962 4.00
 
1963 1.80
 
1964 1.64
 
Average 3.17
 
aThese figures are due mainly to bad harvests.
 
Source: Ki Choon Han, "Capital-Output Ratio in Korea -- A 
Trial," Ouarterly Economic Research, Econcinic Planning 
Board, Republic of Korea, June 1964. 
TABLE 17. AVERAGE CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIOS, BY INDUSTRY, KOREA, 1962
 
Industry Ratio
 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 1.54
 
Mining and quarrying .42
 
Manufacturing 1.07
 
Construction 3.95
 
Electricity, water, and sanitary services 12.03
 
Transportation, storage, and communications 7.09
 
Ownership of dwellings 6.98
 
Average 2.41
 
Source: Ki Choon Han, "Capital-Output Ratio in Korea -- A Trial,"
 
juarterly Economic Research, Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea,
 
June 1964.
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but is more realistic in terms of its contribution to economic growth.
 
Another related sector is construction which, with other sectors, also
 
benefits from investment in new housing. Due to the linkages or inter­
dependencies among industries an increase in the demand for housing generates
 
derived demands for the output of many industries, but most particularly for
 
construction. The benefits to the building industry will be larger, the lower
 
its operating ratio, since the increase in output can be accommodated with a
 
less than proportional increase in investment. Unfortunately, no data are
 
available on the operating ratio of the construction industry to support such
 
a conclusion, however annual construction volume in square meters is a crude
 
proxy (Table 18). Unless the industry can contract and expand rapidly,
 
the wide fluctuations in output revealed by the time-series, strongly suggest
 
a low level of production relative to capacity. With output of 1.74 million
 
square meters in 1959, it is likely that the industry operated with excess
 
capacity during earlier years when output averaged only about 1.1 million square
 
meters and between 1960 and 1962 when the figure averaged approximately 1.4
 
million. 
If true, then the derived demands for output from the construction
 
industry are likely to yield 
sizable returns by more effectively using
 
existing capacity.
 
TABLE 13. BUILDING PERMITS IN FLOOR AREA, KOREA, 1956-1964
 
(InThousands of Square Meters)
 
Year Dwellings Total 
1956 
1957 
328.9 
263.9 
1,114.8 
1,055.6 
1958 443.2 1,251.8 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
191 
_ 
734.8 
650.1 
370.5 
390.6 
747.6 
829.6 
1,741.6 
1,402.7 
1,161.4 
1,699.6 
2,152.8 
2,509.7 
bource: The banc of Korea, Heview o Korean Economy in 1V64" 
(Seoul: The Author, 1965), P. 133.
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The evidence presented in this section supports the economic feasibility
 
of housing as a tool for the economic development of the Hambaek region.
 
Although housing ranks as a particularly attractive investment in comparison
 
to alternative uses of capital, more definitive conclusions- can only be
 
drawn after considering side-effects on the Korean economy: the influences
 
on the balance of payments, on prices, and on linked industries.
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APPENDIX I. REGRESSIONS FOR LABOR PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES 
a. 	Linear Trend of Earnings Over Time.
 
The data for wages earned by each group of 50 rehoused and 50 non-rehoused
 
miners were provided for pay periods each of ten days length and exclude overtime. 
Vie define the following variables:
 
=Wr 	 wages (in won) earned by the rehoused (test) group,
 
111n
= wages (in won) earned by the non-rehoused (control) group, and 
T = trend factor (the first ten-day period for each interval before and 
after rehousing = 1), 
From the developmat of earnings graphed in Fiqure 2, it seems likely that the shape
 
of the trend for the year before rehousing Is linear. Regressing earnings against
 
time for each group of workers during this period yields the following:
 
,	b = 137.8484 Tb + 118,183.2764, (1)

r (169.2569)
 
= 199.6432 Tb + 117,032.8213,
Wb n( 270.°0861 )	 (2) 
where superscript b Identifies the year before rehousinq and superscript a will
 
denote the period following, as in equations (3) and (4). The trend factors are
 
insignificant since the correspondinq standard errors (indicated In brackets) are
 
substantially larger than the trend coefficients. In other words, the trend of
 
earnings before rehousing is statistically Insignificant, hence zero.
 
The earnings data for the first year after rehousing show the following re­
lationships to time:
 
148 
r 
979.7725 Ta+ 
(306.7678) 
116,838o6250t (3) 
Va 982.2448 Ta + 112,265o4434. (4) 
n (284.5618) 
The trend of earnings for both groups of miners was highly siqnificant over this
 
period since the computed t-value, the ratio between the regression coefficient
 
and the correipoi.ding standard error, was larger than two while the number of
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observations was 36. Based on these regressions, the increase inweekly earnings
 
in each group of 50 was 13.72 won per week for the average test group member and
 
13.75 won for the average control group member. The derivation of the latter esti­
mate from regression equation (4)will illustrate the adjustment. From the equa­
tion, total wages for the sample of 50 increased 982.24 won each ten days, or
 
19.645 (equivalent to 982.24/50) per worker on average. Adjusting to a week from
 
the ten-day pay period requires multiplying by seven-tenths to yield 13.75.
 
b. Linear Trent of Differences in Earninqs Over Time.
 
The positive trend of earnings after rehousing, in contrast to lack of any
 
trend prior to rehousinq, is not conclusive evidence that better housing is
 
responsible for the increases. Such a conclusion requires an analysis of the
 
differences between wages earned for each time interval durinq the period after
 
rehousing and the corresponding time interval during the period before; that is,
 
the wages earned In the first ten-day period after rehousinq minus the waqes
 
earned in the first ten-day period of the interval before rehousing, end so on.
 
If these differences are significantly larger than zero, then earnings after re­
housing are significantly larger than prior to rehousing.
 
The previous set of regressions suggest an increasinq trend Inwaqe differences 
between the two years. Regressions of these differences yield the following: 
11r = 841.9241 T- 1,344.6508,r(317,3599) (5) 
W = 782.5902 T- 4,767.0857, (6)
n (362.4476)
 
where W Is the difference between wages earned after rehousing during each ten-day
 
period and the earnings of the corresponding periods prior to rehousing, The
 
estimates show that earnings are indeed significan~tly larger than zero at the 95
 
percent level of confidence with a significantly increasing trend, Hence, the
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earnings after relocation are significantly larger than before relocation,
 
c. Non-linear 	Trend of Earninqs Over Time.
 
As indicated in Section 4.4, the wage pattern of each qroup of workers, control
 
and test group, follows a learning or logistic curve (Figure 4). The curve is
 
described algebraically as:
 
y: A (7)
 
1+ be-kt
 
As Fiqure 4 suggests, the increases in earnings had dropped nearly to zero at
 
about the tenth month following rehousing. Output had reached its maximum at the
 
new high and further increases in labor productivity could not be attributed to
 
improved housing. The maximum level in earnings, hence output, can be described
 
by 	rewriting equation (7) and differentiating:
 
AY (­be-kt = 

(9)

dy kAbe-k t 

dt ( + be-kt )2
 
Substituting 	(0) in (9) qives
 
Y
Ak A 

dY ,or dY k(A Y) eY 	 (10)
 
A2
dt dt A
 
y2
 
This leads to
 
(1

1 dY = k 	 (11)
Y dt 	 A"Y 

1 dY 
From this, it follows that the relative or percent increase in Y (- is 
linearly dependent on the absolute level of Yo Both the relative Increase in
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earninqs and the absolute earnings for the two-year period following rehousing can
 
be determined in order to estimate the parameters of (11). For each group, 
1 dyr_
y dt-
-0.02649 yr+ 41.9258, (12) 
yr dt (0,00624) 
1 dyn -0.02252 yn + 34.5051. (13) 
Y dt (0.00594) 
From equation (11), the regression coefficient of Y is - k Since A is the earn­
ings maximum on the logistic curve (7), this level can be calculated by dividing
 
the intercept vwlues, 41,9258 and 34,5051 (= k) for the equations describing test
 
and control group samples respectively, by the corresponding regression coefficients.
 
The earnings maxima derived from these calculations are 2,216 won per week for the
 
average rehoused worker and 2,145 won per week for the average non-rehoused worker.
 
d, Significance of Differences in Productivity between Test and Control Groups
 
During the year prior to rehousing, the productivity of the average test
 
group worker exceeded that of the average control group worker 23 of the 36 ten-day
 
pay-periods. If this difference is statistically significant, then its occurrence
 
is not the result of chance. If not, we would expect an even chance, that is,
 
productivity of the average rehoused worker would be greater 18 (half) of the 36
 
observations and conversely for the remaining half of the total period. Hence, the
 
expected value for each group would be 18. Chi square (X2 ) is estimated as fol]owsi
 
X2 (23 - 18)2 + (18 - 13)2

18 18 - 2.778.
 
Since X2 = 6.635, the observed difference is insignificant. Hence, the
.01l)
 
differences may be regarded as negligible.
 
The differences after rehousing are, however, highly significant. During
 
this two-year period, productivity of the average test group member exceeded that
 
of the average control group member during 50 pay-periods with the reverse holding
 
1For a description of the test see, for example, Ronald A. F'sher, Statistical
 
Methods for Research Wlorkers (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1958).
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for the remaining 14 pay-periods. Based on these data, the chi-square Is 
X2 =(56 36)2 +(36 - 14) 2 26.88936 36 8
 
which exceeds X2 .6635by a substantial margin.

.01(1)
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APPENDIX II.
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN THE NEED FOR HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE
 
Two steps were followed in determining whether changes in the number of in­
patient admissions and out-patient visits were statistically significant after re­
housing compared to before rehousing.
 
First, the expected numbers of admissions and visits were calculated for the
 
test group before and after relocation. Verbally, these numbers indicate an ex­
pected change in the level If rehousing hod not occurred. Calculation of the
 
expected number involves projecting =he control group changes, or before/after
 
ratio, on the test group's record. 
The numbers for before and after relocation
 
were obtained by dividing the sum of the test group's before and after rehousing
 
averages by the before-after ratio of the control group. The expected and actual
 
levels for the test group were as follows:
 
Before 
 After
 
l.rIhousnq I ho s na Total
 
Out-patient visits:
 
Actual 527 
 442 969
 
Expected 480 
 489 969
 
In-patient days:
 
Actual 25 11 36
 
Expected 15 21 36
 
Second, the significance of the differences between expected and actual was
 
calculated using the chi-square (X2) test. At X2 
 = 6.635, the probability is
 
.01()
 
at least 99 percent that the differences between actual and expected values are
 
statistically significant, hence that 
 better housing has significantly affected
 
health and medical conditions, provided that the calculated values for X2 exceed
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6.635. These values are calculated for out-patient visits and in-patient days as
 
follows:
 
X2 (5274 480)2 + (489 9442)2 919
 
0 
X2 
= (25 - 15)2 + (21 - 11)2 11,4299i 15 21
 
where subscripts o and i refer to out-pntients and in-patients respectively.
 
Since both values of X2 are greater then 6.635, it follows that the differences
 
are significant and not simply the result of chance.
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APPENDIX III. ESTIMATES OF HEALTH AD MEDICAL CARE COSTS
 
Annual costs of medical care consist of two components, capital amortization
 
(or depreciation) and operating costs. The annual capital element is derived by
 
estimating the depreciation of buildings and equipment from data supplied by the
 
Dae Han Coal Corporation: 
Hospital Building Medical Equipment 
Initial cost 7,425,069 won 2,334,984 won 
Annual depreciation: 
Amount given 366,193 won 467,000 won 
Price level change 24% 49% 
Amount adjusted for price change 454,000 won 695,830 won 
The depreciation data supplied (amount given) ignore changes in the price level.
 
Our correction of these data is based on the change in the cost of building
 
materials and general prices in Korea. Between 1960 and 1963, the general price
 
level rose from 1CO to 149 while the prices of building materials increased from
 
100 to 124.1 To account for these changes, depreciation of the hospital building
 
is increased 24 percent and the depreciation for medical equipment is Increased 49
 
percent to yield adjusted values of 454,000 and 695,830 won respectively.2
 
For purposes of calculating operating costs and differences in costs for
 
out- and in-patientsthe following facts are relevant. Hospital rooms and medical
 
1United Nations Economic and Social Council, Review of Housing Situation in
 
the ECAFE Countries, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Committee on
 
Industry and Natural Resources, Working Party on Housing and Building Materials,
 
Eighth Session, Bangkok, Thailand (Bangkok: The author, 1965), p. 51.
 
2This assumes that the hospital and the equipment are about five years old
 
on average.
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equipment are used rarely by out-patients. Medical equipment is used extensively
 
for in-patients only for the first examination and seldom during routine examina­
tions. We shall assume first, that, on the average, cost of the use of medical
 
equipment for one outpatient visit is equal to the medical equipment cost of one
 
in-patient hospitalization day and, second, that the use of the hospital room by
 
one 
 in-patient is comparable with the space required for four out-patients.
 
Since costs of interest for capital were unavailable, two interest rate
 
assumptions are employed. Cne reflects the cost of subsidized capital, the other,
 
a market rate for capital. The low alternative, four percent, is the rate charged
 
for loans made by the U. S. government for the housing project. The high alterna­
tive is an approximation of market rates. Given the structure of interest rates
 
prevailing In May 1963 (Table 14), we have assumed that a rate of about 15 percent
 
is appropriate. The annual Interest charges in won are based on one-half the
 
initial costs of the hospital building and its equipment:
 
Hospital Building Medical Equipment 
4% alternative 148,501 46,700 
15% alternative 556,880 175,124 
The costs per patient for depreciation and Interest are obtained by dividing yearly
 
costs by the estimated capacity separately for In- and out-patient care. These
 
costs, together with supplementary data provided by the medical staff of the Ham­
baek hospital, provide costs per in-patient or per hospitalization day.
 
Hospital capacity is estimated from Information on the number of out-patient
 
visits and days of hospitalization. Before rehousing, the average person visited
 
the hospital as an out-patient 2.31 times per year and was hospitalized .157 days
 
per annum (Section 5.2). 
 The services of the medical facility were available to
 
8,550 persons (1,425 employees times six persons per family). Hence capacity must
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be sufficient to accommodate 1,342 in-patient hospital days (8,550 x .157) and
 
19,751 out-patient visits (8,550 x 2.31) each year.
 
Costs are estimated as follows:
 
Per outpatient visit Per in-patient day 
Cost Item 4% 15% 4% 15% 
Alternative Alternative Alternative Alternativ 
Depreciation: 51.0 51.0 105.0 105.0 
For the hospital buildinga (18.0) (18.0) (72.0) (72.0) 
For the medical equipmentb (33.0) (33.0) (33.0) (33.0) 
Interest charges 8.1 30.5 25.8 97,1 
Doctors' costsc 250.C 250.0 250.0 250.0 
Medicine and other costsc 128.0 128.0 231.0 231.0 
Total for one visit or day 437.1 459.5 611.8 603.1 
Average for one visit or day 448 647 
aTotal annual depreciation is divided by 19,751 plus 4 x 1,342 in-patients to
 
arrive at depreciation for one day hospitalization as an out-patient.

bSince in- and out-patients are comparable, the figure was derived as deprecia­
tion divided by 21,093 patients.
 
cGiven.
 
Hospitals in the vicinity of Hambaek charged an average of 440 wov, for an
 
out-patient visit or for one day hospitalization. However, It is questionable
 
whether these facilities are fully self-supporting. For Instance, their deprecia­
tion costs fail to take price changes into account and It is likely that the hos­
pital costs are subsidized or supported externally to some extent.
 
Since the four percent and 15 percent alternatives hardly differ in total,
 
the estimates Ir the text are based on the average of both alternatives.
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-- 
APPENDIX IV. SELECTED CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING DATA, KOREA, 1960
 
(all figures in thousands)
 
Population characteristics
 
Population, total 

Male 

Female 

Households, total 

Private 

Collective 

Iousing ch;,racteristics
 
Dwelling units, total 

Ly occupancy status
 
Occupied 

Vacant 

By number of rooms
 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

lO 
Unknown 

Median* 

Mean* 

Dwelling units, total 

By room area (in Pyong)
 
Less than 2 

2-3 

4-5 

6-7 

8-9 

10+ 

Unknown 

iedian* 

Mean* 

Dwelling units, total 

By various types of facilities
 
dith kitchen 

,ith bathroom 

With storercom 

tfith electricity 

With radio 

With barn for cattle 

*Estimates (Table continued 

Urban 

6,851 

3,349 

3,502 

1,263 

1,250 

13 

1,300 

1,263 

37 

608 

397 

178 

70 

24 

7 

3 

3 

3 

7 

1.1 
1.9 

1,300 

432 

402 

196 

86 

40 

45 

19 

2.4 

3.3 

1,30) 

1,155 

54 

119 

889 

401 

63 

p6next paqe)
 
Rural 

17,593 

8,644 

8,949 

3,120 

3,095 

25 

3,170 

3,120 

50 

652 

1,395 

750 

256 

62 

28 

5 

3 

1 

3 

15 

1.7 

2.3 

3,170 

498 

1,304 

834 

319 

109 

57 

49 

2.8 

3.7 

3,170 

3,054 

28 

763 

347 

249 

1,225 

Total Total
 
Number Percent
 
24,444 100o0
 
11,993 49.1
 
12,451 50.9
 
4,383 100.0
 
4,345 9911
 
38 0.9
 
4,470 100.0
 
4,383 98.1
 
87 1.9
 
1,260 28.2
 
1,792 40.1
 
928 20.8
 
326 7.3
 
87 1.9
 
34 0.8
 
8 0.2
 
6 0.1
 
1 0.0
 
6 0.1
 
22 0.5
 
1.5
 
2.2
 
4,470 100.0
 
930 20.8
 
1,785 39.9
 
1,030 23.0
 
405 9.1
 
149 3.3
 
102 2.3
 
69 1.6
 
2.7
 
3.5
 
4,470 100.0
 
4,209 94.2
 
02 1.8
 
882 19.7
 
1,235 27.6
 
651 14.6
 
1,208 28.8
 
Total Total
 
Urban Rural Number Percent
 
By type of toilet 
Earth pit 115 615 731 16.4 
Concrete pit 317 517 835 18.7 
Flush 4 1 4 0.1 
Other 428 1,798 2,226 49.8 
None 429 223 652 14.6 
Unknown 7 15 23 0.5 
Dwelling units, total 1,300 3,170 4,470 100,0 
By source of drinking water 
Public well 548 2,538 3,086 69,0 
Private well with pump 38 35 72 1.6 
Private well without pump 73 318 391 8.7 
Public piped water system 392 6 398 8.9 
Private piped water system 211 2 213 4.7 
Other 29 254 283 6,3 
Unknown 9 17 26 0.6 
Source: Korea Economic Planning board, "Samplo Tibulation, Advance Report for the
 
1960 Population and Housing Census of Korea." Tables 1, 19, 20, 22-25.
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